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INTRODUCTION
T HE GENERAL AVIATION Revitalization Act of 1994
("GARA")' established an 18-year statute of repose for law-
Many people contributed to the effort to enact the General Aviation Revitali-
zation Act of 1994, which, as this article will show, helped preserve the general
aviation industry in the United States. The following are among them. George
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suits against manufacturers of general aviation aircraft and
component parts.2 Passed as an effort to revive the ailing gen-
eral aviation aircraft industry, GARA was hailed as a 'job-creat-
ing and job-restoring measure."3 It has fulfilled its promise. In
the past seven years, the general aviation aircraft industry has
briskly rebounded - and many credit GARA for that result.
Opponents of the bill, however, argued prior to its passage
that the bill was unnecessary, and that it would deprive people
injured in general aviation aircraft accidents of their right to
seek compensation. Since the enactment of GARA, plaintiffs
have offered creative arguments to avoid the application of the
repose period in their cases.'
For the most part, courts have recognized the need for GARA
and they have interpreted GARA's provisions to further Con-
gressional intent. Some courts, however, have limited the appli-
cation of GARA. Such rulings, if carried to the extreme, will
undo much of the good accomplished by GARA.
This article provides an overview of the history and purpose of
GARA. It shows the accomplishments of the legislation. It ana-
lyzes GARA's provisions and the key case law that has construed
it. It demonstrates why the law is constitutional. Finally, the ar-
ticle provides a foundation for future interpretations of GARA.
I. A BRIEF HISTORY OF GENERAL AVIATION
General aviation is all aviation other than commercial and
military aviation. General aviation aircraft range from small, sin-
gle-engine planes to mid-size turboprops to the larger turbofans
capable from flying from New York to Tokyo. These planes are
Underhill, a pilot and successful businessman in Louisville, Kentucky, inspired
the concept behind GARA. Many public servants helped enact GARA, but special
efforts were made by then-Kansas Representative Dan Glickman, Utah Represen-
tative James Hansen, and Senators Nancy Kassebaum and John McCain. Frank
Hunger, Assistant Attorney General for the Civil Division at the Department of
Justice, understood the severity of the problem and the need for a fair and bal-
anced legislative solution. His support helped persuade President Clinton to sign
GARA into law.
2 Pub. L. No. 103-298, § 2(d), 108 Stat. 1552 (1994), amended, Pub. L. No. 105-
102, § 3(e), 111 Stat. 2215 (1997) (codified at 49 U.S.C. § 40101 note).
3 See President's Signing Statement, 30 WEEKLY COMP. PRES. Doc. 1678 (Aug.
22, 1994), relrinted in 1994 U.S.C.C.A.N. 1654 [hereinafter "President's Signing
Statement"].
4 See Kathryn Humphrey, Esq., Remarks, General Aviation Revitalization Act Panel
Discussion, 63J. AIR L. & Com. 169, 175 (1997).
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used for business and recreation.5 They are used by federal,
state and local governments for activities ranging from emer-
gency medical evacuations to border patrols to firefighting.
They are used by individuals and businesses, colleges and uni-
versities, and other interests to reach the more than 5,000 small
and rural communities in the United States that are not served
by commercial airlines.6
Since the time of the Wright Brothers, the United States has
dominated nearly every aspect of aviation, including general avi-
ation manufacturing.7 Industry pioneers like Walter and Olive
Ann Beech, Clyde Cessna, William Piper, and Bill Lear built ma-
jor companies.8 World War II produced a number of highly
trained pilots, aircraft mechanics, and aerospace engineers, who
built "a multitude of single- and multi-engine light piston air-
craft" in their "backyard garages, small town factories, and major
manufacturers' plants."9 Ex-army air corps personnel provided
aircraft maintenance, fuel services, sales support, and pilot train-
ing. " ' With the resultant surge in interest in general aviation
5 See United States General Accounting Office, Pub. No. GAO-01-916, General
Aviation: Status of the Industry, Related Infrastructure, and Safety Issues 2, 10-12 (2001)
[hereinafter "GAO General Aviation Report"]. "In 1998, personal flying ac-
counted for 36 percent of all general aviation hours flown, nearly three times
more than the next largest segment, business flying." Id. at 2. "The other major
use categories include corporate flying, which involves the use of an aircraft
owned by a corporation or business and flown by a professional pilot; instruc-
tional flying; and aerial application, which includes activities such as agricultural
spraying." Id.
The general aviation fleet in the United States consists of about 219,000 ac-
tive aircraft with an average age of about 27 years. [d. The largest category of
aircraft is single-engine propeller, typically used for personal and instructional
flying, which in 1998 made up 70 percent of the general aviation fleet.
7 See GENERAL AVIATION MANUFACTURERS ASSOCIATION, LIABILITY REFORM FOR
GENERAL AvIATION: A NEED AT THE POINT OF CRISIS 3 (1992) [hereinafter "A
Need at the Point of Crisis"].
8 Review of Revisions in Small Aircraft Liability Laws: Statement before the Subcomm.
on Consumer Affairs, Foreign Commerce & Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce,
Science and Transportation, 105th Cong. (1997) (statement of Edward M. Bolen,
President, General Aviation Manufacturers Association) [hereinafter "Bolen Tes-
timony"]. Cessna Aircraft Company and Piper Aircraft Corporation emerged as
the dominant manufacturers of small, single engine two- and four-passenger air-
planes. See Robert Martin, General Aviation Manufacturing: An Industry Under Siege,
in THE LIABILITY MAZE 478, 480 (Peter W. Huber & Robert Litan eds. 1991).
Beech Aircraft Corporation concentrated on the manufacture of somewhat
larger and more expensive aircraft. Id.
9 Timothy S. McAllister, A "Tail" of Liability Reform: General Aviation Revitaliza-
tion Act of 1994 and the General Aviation Industry in the United States, 23 TRANSP. L.J.
301, 304 (1995).
1o Id.
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during the 1960s and 1970s, "the 'Big Three' [manufacturers]
created a comprehensive product line of general aviation air-
craft, established an infrastructure that provided sales and train-
ing, and aggressively marketed the industry of general
aviation."' 1 As interest in general aviation rose, its safety in-
creased. The number of fatal general aviation aircraft accidents
dropped 700 percent between the end of World War II and
1994. The general aviation accident rate itself dropped by 30
percent between 1981 and 1994.12
By the late 1970s, the general aviation industry in the United
States was at its high point. Twenty-nine aircraft manufacturers
produced general aviation aircraft, and the industry reported
revenues of more than $2 billion a year.13 General aviation and
its related industries contributed more than $40 billion annually
to the U.S. economy and employed more than 540,000 people.1 4
But by the end of the 1980s, the general aviation industry was
in economic trouble. There was a serious and "precipitous" de-
cline in the manufacture and sale of general aviation aircraft by
U.S. companies.' 5 One cause was the increase in the price of a
plane. This, in turn, was fueled by the tremendous increase in
the cost of the industry's liability insurance.'" General aviation
aircraft shipments by U.S. manufacturers dropped from 18,000
aircraft in 1978 to 928 aircraft in 1994.'" The decline was even
more significant for single engine piston aircraft: 14,000 aircraft
built in 1978 to 555 aircraft built in 1993.18 Along with the loss
of production came the loss of over 100,000jobs in general avia-
I Jennifer L. Anton, A Critical Evaluation of the General Aviation Revitalization Act
of 1994, 63J. AIR L. & COM. 759, 766 (1998) (citing McAllister, supra note 9, at
304-05).
12 140 CONG. REc. H4998-02, H5000 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Clinger) [hereinafter "Clinger Statement"].
13 See Thomas H. Kister, General Aviation Revitalization Act: Its Effect on Manufac-
turers, 65 DEF. COUNS. J. 109, 110-11 (1998) (quoting John H. Boswell & George
Andrew Coats, Saving the General Aviation Industry: Putting Tort Reform to the Test, 60
J. AIR L. & COM. 533, 535 (1995)); William J. Cook, The Take Off in the Small-Plane
Market After Years on the Ground, The Industry Looks Up, U.S. NEWS & WORLD REP.,
Aug. 21, 1995, at 50; McAllister, supra note 9, at 305.
14 See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5.
15 See McAllister, supra note 9, at 305-06.
16 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 1646 (1994); see also McAllister, supra
note 9, at 306-07.
17 See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 4.
18 140 CONG. REc. H4998-02, H5000 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Oberstar) [hereinafter "Oberstar Statement"].
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tion manufacturing and related industries.'" In 1978, the indus-
try manufactured 18,000 general aviation aircraft and employed
6,000 workers. In 1992, the industry manufactured only 900
general aviation aircraft and employed only 1,000 workers.2"
This decline in general aviation manufacturing also worsened
the United States' position in international trade. Historically,
at least 30 percent of the general aviation aircraft produced in
the United States had been exported.21 In 1980, the United
States exported $120 million surplus in single engine piston air-
craft, but that surplus declined to a mere $5 million in 1992.22
In 1980, there were 29 U.S. manufacturers of general aviation
aircraft and 15 foreign manufacturers. By 1992, the numbers
had switched: there were 29 foreign manufacturers, and only 9
U.S. manufacturers.2 3
II. A BRIEF HISTORY OF GARA
A. IDENTIFYING THE PROBLEM
By the mid-1980s, Congress had launched efforts to provide
relief for domestic manufacturers of general aviation aircraft.
Congressional hearings found that the biggest factor in the in-
19 See id.; see also John H. Boswell & George Andrew Coats, Saving the General
Aviation Industry: Putting Tort Reform to the Test, 60 J. AIR L. & CoM. 533, 574 n.3
(1995) (citing Russell W. Meyer, Statute of Repose - Key to Industy Future, in GEN-
ERAL AVIATION MFG. ASS'N INDUS. REV.: 1994 OUTLOOK AND AGENDA 1 (Feb. 9,
1994)).
21 140 CONG. REc. S2995-01, S2996 (daily ed. March 16, 1994) (statement of
Sen. Hutchison). Cessna closed its single engine aircraft production lines in
1986 based solely on a perceived unlimited exposure to litigation. See Meyer,
supra note 19, at 1. Piper Aircraft, one of the leading manufacturers of general
aviation aircraft since the 1930s, experienced several decades of growth through
the 1970s - selling more than 5,000 aircraft annually by the late 1970s. But
throughout the 1980s, Piper's sales plummeted as the general aviation industry
suffered. "By 1990, the Company was selling less than 1/10th the number of
aircraft it had sold during the previous 10 years." Review of Revisions in Small Air-
craft Liability Laws- Statement before the Senate Subcomm. on Consumer Affairs, Foreign
Commerce & Tourism of the Senate Comm. on Commerce, Science and Transp., 105th
Cong. (1997) (statement of Paul A. Newman, Chief Financial Officer, The New
Piper Aircraft, Inc.) [hereinafter "Newman Testimony"]. In July 1991, Piper filed
for Chapter 11 reorganization and stayed there for four years. It laid off virtually
its entire workforce. Id.
21 THE NATIONAL COMMISSION TO ENSURE A STRONG COMPETITIVE AiRLINE IN-
DUSTRY, A REPORT TO THE PRESIDENT AND CONGRESS 26 (Aug. 1993) [hereinafter
"Presidential Commission Report"].
22 Oberstar Statement, supra note 18.
23 Id.
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dustry's decline was the skyrocketing cost of products liability. 4
A fundamental contribution to this escalating cost was the so-
called "long tail" of liability.25 Tens of thousands of aircraft had
been sold in the 1940s, 1950s, 1960s and 1970s. But by the mid-
1980s, fewer than a thousand planes were sold each year. The
cost of those planes had to cover an ever-growing liability expo-
sure that arose from planes sold in the distant and very distant
past.26 Executives from the general aviation industry testified
that relief from the "long tail" of liability "would revitalize the
industry and result in an increase in jobs, enable manufacturers
to spend more on research and development, and enhance
manufacturers' ability to compete with foreign companies. '2
The hearings demonstrated that high product liability costs
were driving manufacturers out of business. For example, in
1986, Cessna, the world's largest producer of piston-powered
aircraft, closed its piston engine lines because of the high liabil-
ity costs. Between 1965 and 1982, Cessna invested between $20
million and $25 million each year in research and develop-
ment.28 Cessna halted piston engine research in 1986 but spent
$20 million to $25 million each year thereafter defending prod-
ucts liability cases.29 In other words, it spent about $160 million
over 8 years to defend lawsuits involving aircraft as much as 47
years old."0 At the request of the House Aviation Subcommittee,
Beech Aircraft Corporation conducted a study of airplane
crashes in one four-year period. Of 203 crashes, all of which
were investigated by the National Transportation Safety Board
(NTSB) or the Federal Aviation Administration (FAA), not one
was attributable to a design or manufacturing defect. Yet the
average claim was $10 million, and the manufacturer was forced
24 Newman Testimony, supra note 20.
25 Bolen Testimony, supra note 8.
26 See Newman Testimony, supra note 20. For example, by 1987 the major
manufacturers calculated that their costs for products liability per general avia-
tion product unit ranged from $70,000 to $100,000. See Martin, supra note 8, at
483; see also GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 18 (discussing the rise
in lawsuits against the general aviation industry after the introduction of the strict
liability doctrine).
27 Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124, 131 (Cal. Ct.
App. 2000) (citing H.R. RFP. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 1641 (1994)).
28 Boswell & Coats, supra note 19, at 574 n.115 (citing Meyer, supra note 19, at
2).
29 Id.
s0 140 CONG. Ruc. H4998-02, H4999 (daily ed. June 27, 1994) (statement of
Rep. Fish).
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to spend an average of $530,000 defending each accident.3'
What government investigators established as "zero-defect per-
formance"32 ended up costing Beech over $100 million in legal
fees over four years.33
This kind of potential liability made it difficult for these com-
panies to afford insurance. In 1985, insurers began to withdraw
product liability coverage for general aviation manufacturers. 4
"We are quite prepared to insure the risks of aviation, but not
the risks of the American legal system," one prominent Lloyd's
aviation underwriter said.3 5 By 1987, Piper was "entirely unin-
sured" for its product liability exposure, Cessna was uninsured
for the first $100 million annual aggregate loss, and Beech Air-
craft was self-insured for losses and defense costs up to $50 mil-
lion a year.3
After the insurance industry stopped writing insurance for
general aviation manufacturers, the manufacturers' only re-
maining method of paying these claims was to increase product
prices for consumers.17 During the Senate debate on GARA,
Sen. Hutchison of Texas said that the cost of product liability is
"directly reflected in the price of the product; Beech Aircraft
estimates that the costs of litigation added $70,000 to the cost of
each new aircraft.""H The chairman of Cessna estimated that the
cost of liability insurance on an airplane that sold for $85,000
was between $40,000 and $50,000, and that covering the cost of
liability had become the highest single expense of the air-
plane. 9 This cost was passed on to consumers in the form of
M' See Martin, supra note 8, at 483-84; Clinger Statement, supra note 12; Bolen
Testimony, supra note 8.
3 SeeA Need at the Point of Crisis, supra note 7, at 4; Martin, supra note 8, at
483-84.
33 See Martin, supra note 8, at 483-84; Clinger Statement, supra note 12; Bolen
Testimony, supra note 8.
54 Kister, supra note 13, at 110-11; Boswell & Coats, supra note 19, at 549.
.'5 Boswell & Coats, supra note 19, at 549 (citing Martin, supra note 8, at 483-
84); Kister, supra note 13, at 111 (same).
36 See Martin, supra note 8, at 483-84. Although products liability was not the
only reason Piper Aircraft went into bankruptcy in the early 1990s-some argued
it was severely overstaffed-the uninsured posture the company assumed due to
the cost of liability insurance rendered the company unfundable through tradi-
tional financing sources. Suma Outlines Plans for New Models, New Technology from
the New Piper Aircraft, WKLY. Bus. AVIATION, Aug. 7, 1995, at 55.
37 See Boswell & Coats, supra note 19, at 550.
38 140 CONG. REC. S2995, S2996 (daily ed. March 15, 1994).
39 See supra note 13, at 112 (citing David J. Moffitt, The Implications of Tort Reform
for General Aviation, 10J. AIR & SPACE L. 8, at n.6 (1995)).
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higher prices. The increase in prices of new aircraft deterred
some consumers from buying at all and caused other consumers
to turn to less expensive used aircraft.' The decline in sales
further increased the prices that suppliers had to charge to stay
in business, creating a vicious cycle.41
The American Association of Trial Lawyers (ATLA) was the
primary opponent to general aviation tort reform.42 ATLA testi-
fied that a number of factors unrelated to tort liability contrib-
uted to the sales decline. The identified factors included tax law
changes, including elimination of the investment tax credit and
imposition of a 10 percent luxury tax (since repealed); in-
creased industry emphasis on more profitable private jets; com-
petition from unassembled "kit" versions of piston-engine
aircraft; availability of high quality used aircraft; widely available
commercial flights; and a decline in trained pilots. 4: ATLA also
said that the existing aircraft were of too high a quality, thus
contributing to lengthy, durable and reliable service lives. 4
ATLA argued that litigation threats encouraged manufacturers
to emphasize safety in the design, testing and manufacturing
process, and that reform merely would reduce costs to the in-
dustry by wrongfully taking money from deserving plaintiffs. 45
40 Barron's reported an amazing example of the increased price: "A small
Beechcraft aimed at the private recreational market listed for $26,550 in 1974.
Today, Beech's smallest plane is a little bigger than the '74 model, but it lists for
$255,800." Thomas G. Donlan, Falling from the Sky: Unlimited Liability Claims De-
stroy an American Industry, BARRON'S, Feb. 21, 1994, at 10.
41 See Martin, supra note 8, at 483. The number of pilot licenses and the num-
ber of hours flown in general aviation declined steadily between 1980 and 1994.
For example, the number of student pilot licenses decreased more than one
third, from 150,000 in 1980 to 96,000 in 1994. GAO General Aviation Report,
supra note 5, at 5.
42 See Anton, supra note 11, at 773; Patrick J. Shea, Solving America's General
Aviation Crisis: The Advantages of Federal Preemption Over Tort Reform, 80 CORNELL L.
REv. 747, 781-82 (1995).
43 Bruce Kuhse, Products Liability Law in Aviation Mishaps; Florida's 1999 Tort
Reform Legislation and the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994, 74-AUG FL\. B.
J. 22, 24 (2000).
44 Id.; H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2.
45 See Limiting Liability for Small Aircrafts: Hearing on H.R. 3087 and S. 1458 Before
the Economic and Commercial Law SubComm. of the House Judiciary Comm., 103d
Cong. (1994) (statement of Charles T. Hvass,Jr.); Boswell & Coats, supra note 19,
at 552 (discussing the sharp decline in the number of fatal general aviation acci-
dents per 100,000 flight hours between 1950 and 1969, despite the fact that mod-
ern products liability had not yet been developed or gained wide acceptance);
Kuhse, supra note 43, at 24. Kuhse noted that while factors such as fuel price
increases, airline deregulation and tax law changes appeared to contribute to the
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Other factors cited as contributing to a decline in general avi-
ation included oversaturation of the market when more than
14,000 single-engine planes were built in 1978, combined with
the generally poor economic conditions of the early 1980s.46
Experts generally agreed, however, that the dramatic rise in
costs due to product liability exposure and related manufacturer
product insurance premiums were a significant cause of the in-
dustry's decline.47
In 1993, five years after Congress first attempted to address
the industry problem, the National Commission to Ensure a
Strong Competitive Airline Industry studied the decline in the
general aviation industry. The Commission found that "al-
though the U.S. remains a world leader in production and sale
of business jets, production of light piston aircraft has been re-
duced to a trickle by the enormous ongoing cost of open-ended
product liability. '48 The Commission noted that: "Many factors
are at play, but the added costs of liability insurance forced
prices up, causing sharply increased costs for personal and
short-range business flying. '49 This finding by an objective body
helped move GARA forward in Congress.
B. FINDING A SOLUTION
Some states had enacted legislative solutions for problems
caused by excessive tort liability in general, "but they were not
universal, and the inconsistencies from state to state caused
general aviation industry's downturn, other anti-GARA arguments lacked the sup-
port of any rational cause-and-effect relationship, such as the:
availability of 'build it yourself kit aircraft (the homebuilt 'experi-
mental' aircraft demanded mechanical and construction skills be-
yond the ability of most pilots plus required thousands of hours of
'free time' labor); demand for used aircraft (simple economics
would indicate that as the prices for new aircraft shot up, the de-
mand for lower priced used aircraft would also increase); [and a]
shortage of trained pilots (does a shortage of trained pilots cause a
lack of demand for low end single-engine training aircraft or does
the high cost of new aircraft cause a shortage of trained pilots?).
Kuhse, supra note 43, at 24.
46 See Scott E. Tarry & Lawrence J. Truitt, Rhetoric and Reality: Tort Reform and
the Uncertain Future of General Aviation, 61 J. AIR L. & COM. 163, 167, 192 (1995).
47 See id. at 193; Kister, supra note 13, at 111; GAO General Aviation Report,
supra note 5, at 24-27.
48 Presidential Commission Report, supra note 21, at 26.
49 Id.
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more problems. '50 The need for a uniform approach called out
for a federal legislative solution. Members of Congress from
Kansas, the headquarters of many general aviation aircraft man-
ufacturers, spearheaded the effort at federal aviation tort re-
form, particularly Sen. Nancy Kassebaum (R-Kan.) and Rep.
Dan Glickman (D-Kan.), Rep. James Hansen (R-Utah), and Sen.
John McCain (R-Ariz.) also played a critical role.
Most members of Congress recognized that there was a legiti-
mate jurisdictional basis for federal legislation because the fed-
eral government heavily regulates all aspects of the general
aviation industry "from cradle to grave."' General aviation air-
craft must meet rigid standards set by the Federal Aviation Ad-
ministration. " Before any aircraft flies for the first time, it must
be inspected and certified as airworthy by the FAA. If it is to be
produced in any number, the aircraft must meet a further set of
FAA-prescribed criteria.5
The initial proposals for aviation industry liability reform cov-
ered many tort issues." As originally introduced by Sen. Kas-
sebaum and approved by the Senate Commerce Committee in
1986, general aviation reform would have done a number of
things. It would have: (1) created a single body of nationwide
substantive law for aviation liability, including uniform stan-
dards of negligence; (2) limited punitive damages; (3) modified
comparative negligence; (4) altered the rules of evidence in
general aviation cases to explicitly provide that plaintiffs cannot
present evidence of subsequent remedial measures; (5) abol-
ished joint and several liability; (6) created a two-year federal
statute of limitations for bringing liability actions; and (7) al-
50 William L. Oliver, Jr. & Michael G. Jones, Repose Statute Helps Revitalise an
American Industry: the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 (GARA), AVIATION
Q. 245, 246 (1997); see also Christopher C. McNatt, Jr. & Steven L. England, The
Push for Statutes of Repose in General Aviation, 23 TRANSP. L.J. 323, 327-28 (1995)
(analyzing state statutes of repose in existence at the time of passage of GARA
and explaining why Congressional action was necessary to provide uniformity in
the area of general aviation accidents).
51 H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 5.
52 See Federal Aviation Act of 1958, 49 U.S.C. App. §§1301 et seq. (Titles VI, VII
and IX specifically).
53 See Shea, supra note 42, at 750-55 (discussing the scope and history of federal
regulation of the general aviation industry); GAO General Aviation Report, supra
note 5, at 18-21 (same).
54 In the years prior to GARA, Congress considered a variety of bills that dealt
with tort reform, in general, and product liability reform, in general. These bills
were not passed, the votes splitting mainly along party lines. See Oliver & Jones,
supra note 50, at 246.
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lowed automatic removal of cases to federal courts as well as a
statute of repose (originally sought to be 12 years).55 This com-
prehensive approach did not prove to be politically viable. 6
While various legislative proposals garnered support from
large groups of legislators, "the bills invariably died in commit-
tee, usually in the House Judiciary Committee, which during this
time was chaired by Rep. [Jack] Brooks (D-Tex.), a strong oppo-
nent of tort reform. 57
In 1993, counsel to the General Aviation Manufacturers Asso-
ciation (GAMA) suggested that a broader approach could not
be successful and asked GAMA's president to select one issue
that would be the most important to GAMA's members. The
president selected a statute of repose, which would address the
long-tail liability problem and substantially reduce insurance
risks for GAMA members. As a result, GAMA's Congressional
supporters introduced a bill with a single provision for a 15-year
statute of repose. The new bill gained significantly more politi-
cal support than prior legislative efforts .5  To garner the con-
sensus necessary to obtain clearance for consideration and
approval in the Senate, the bill was further modified to extend
the statute of repose period to 18 years.5 'j Exceptions were ad-
ded to exempt cases involving misrepresentations to the FAA
and written warranties."'
-55 See S. 2794, 99th Cong. (1986). Sen. Kassebaum subsequently introduced
similar legislation in five consecutive terms of Congress. Shea, supra note 42, at
768 (citing a telephone interview with Mike Horak, press secretary to Sen. Kas-
sebaum, Nov. 10, 1994)).
56 See, e.g., S. RUp. No. 101-303, at 2 (1990) (the Senate Judiciary Committee
issued an adverse report on general aviation legislation, concluding, inter alia,
that "[t]he General Aviation Accident Liability Standards Act [S. 640] should not
be passed by the Senate and enacted into law. The bill has not been proven to be
necessary and would represent an unwise policy decision on the part of the Sen-
ate, if adopted. Further, a number of the specific substantive provisions of the
bill are so problematic that the entire bill is fatally flawed.").
57 See Oliver & Jones, supra note 50, at 246.
58 See id. at 246-47.
59 Instead of the uniform 18-year statute of repose imposed by the 1994 Act, an
amendment introduced by Rep. Rick Boucher (R-Va.) proposed a sliding scale,
three-pronged approach. See 140 CONG. REC. H4998-02, H5000 (daily ed. June
27, 1994). For piston-powered aircraft, the amendment provided a repose period
of 15 years; for turboprop-powered aircraft, the repose period would have been
18 years; and for jet-powered and other remaining general aviation aircraft, the
repose period would have been 22 years. Id.
60 The House version of the legislation further clarified that it would only ap-
ply to limit suits brought against general aviation manufacturers in their capacity
as manufacturers.
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GARA's supporters emphasized to Congress that if the federal
statute of repose passed, it would likely spur general aviation
production and create new jobs. Russ Meyer, Chairman of
Cessna Aircraft, promised that "Cessna would open a new pis-
ton-engine manufacturing facility and resume piston-engine
production if GARA was passed."'" Moreover, all aspects of the
general aviation industry supported GARA."2
Aircraft owners and their trade association, the Aircraft Own-
ers and Pilots Association (AOPA), were key players in the politi-
cal support for the bill. AOPA's members, the pilots, were the
potential plaintiffs if there were an airplane accident resulting
in injury or death. AOPA's membership was in effect a "con-
sumer group" who would lose existing legal rights if the bill
were enacted. When ATLA argued that the bill was "anti-con-
sumer," AOPA's members said otherwise. The combination of
AOPA's support, the bill's narrow approach, and its packaging
as a 'jobs bill" gave GARA a much greater chance of passage
than earlier, more comprehensive proposals."
Still, the bill appeared to be stuck in the House Judiciary
Committee until certain House members invoked rarely used
parliamentary procedures that essentially forced Chairman
Brooks to allow the bill to be reported out of his committee."4
The bill was passed overwhelmingly by the House. The Senate,
with a 91-8 vote, had already passed a nearly identical bill.65
On the Senate floor, proponents rejected newly proposed
changes, except to allow claims brought by people injured on
the ground by a plane. Proponents accepted the "not on the
plane" exception for two reasons. First, people who might be
injured on the ground were not in AOPA, the group of pilots
that had accepted the liability limitations in the bill. Second,
61 See Oliver & Jones, supra note 50, at 247.
62 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525 pt. 1, at 3; H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 5-6.
GARA had a broad base of support within the general aviation industry, drawing
praise from the General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Aircraft Owners and
Pilots Association, the Experimental Aircraft Association, the International Asso-
ciation of Machinists, the Helicopter Association International, the National Busi-
ness Aircraft Association, and the National Air Transportation Association.
Opponents to the legislation were the American Trial Lawyers' Association and
consumer organizations like Citizen Action and Public Citizen. See McNatt & En-
gland, supra note 50, at 326-27.
63 See Oliver & Jones, supra note 50, at 247.
64 See id.
65 See H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 2; President's Signing Statement, supra
note 3, at 1678.
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the number of claims brought by persons on the ground was
likely to be very few in number, so this exception would not
greatly affect the impact of the bill's liability limit action. The
differences between the House and Senate bills were quickly
smoothed out in the conference committee.6 6
The Administration reviewed the legislation. ATLA had pro-
vided very strong (and early) opposition to the GARA bill, and
the Administration had, in general, been opposed to tort re-
form. GARA supporters had a lucky break, however, when the
White House sent the bill to the Department of Justice for its
review. The bill ended up on the desk of Frank Hunger, Assis-
tant Attorney General for the Civil Division of the Department
of Justice. Mr. Hunger was a long-time pilot and understood
how and why excessive liability had devastated the aviation in-
dustry. He recommended that President Clinton sign the bill.
The President did so on August 17, 1994.
III. THE SUCCESS OF GARA
By the time GARA was enacted, the general aviation industry
had experienced a 95 percent decline in production and a loss
of more than 100,000jobs during the preceding decade. Since
the passage of GARA, general aviation production lines have
opened and expanded.17 More than 25,000 manufacturing jobs
have been created. 68 Thousands of additional jobs have been
created in other segments of the general aviation industry and
the industries that support it.69 Jane F. Garvey, Administrator of
the Federal Aviation Administration, said: "Thanks in large part
to the General Aviation Revitalization Act, the general aviation
industry is now in better shape than it has been in more than a
decade. '717 The United States General Accounting Office re-
ported in 2001 that GARA was "the most significant contributor"
to a rise in general aviation manufacturing. 1
66 See Oliver & Jones, supra note 50, at 247.
67 See General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Five Year Results: A Report to
the President and Congress on the General Aviation Revitalization Act (1999) [hereinaf-
ter "Five Year Results"].
68 Id.
69 Id.; see also GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 65 (stating that in
1998, general aviation generated $64.5 billion in economic activity at the national
level).
70 Five Year Results, supra note 67.
71 See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 6. In addition to GARA,
experts attributed the growth in manufacturing indicators and less-strong growth
in other indicators to the strong economy and the popularity of a new type of
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General aviation's contribution to the national economy has
grown in the past decade. In 1998, general aviation generated
about $64.5 billion in total economic activity at the national
level, an increase of $26.5 billion from the 1988 level of $38 bil-
lion. 2 Since the enactment of GARA, revenues from the export
of general aviation aircraft have more than doubled, boosting
the U.S. economy and the balance of trade. '  As its president
promised Congress, Cessna resumed manufacture of single-en-
gine piston aircraft after GARA was enacted. Cessna con-
structed a new production facility in Independence, Kansas, and
began delivery of the new aircraft in early 1997. Cessna alone
has shipped 3,000 units since it reopened its single-engine pis-
ton production lines in 1996. TM Similarly, Charles M. Suma,
president and chief executive officer of The New Piper Aircraft,
Inc., said: "There is not one single company, government
agency or individual that knows the significance of GARA more
than The New Piper Aircraft, Inc ... we are living proof. We are
The New Piper because of GARA and its limiting effect on the
enormous product liability tail."7 5 With regard to the general
aviation aircraft industry as a whole, annual shipments of new
aircraft tripled between 1994 and 2000, from 928 to 2,816. 7"
Investment in research and development by general aviation
companies has grown by more than 150 percent since GARA was
passed.77 Gary Burrell, president of Garmin International, Inc.,
said: "GARA has been a catalyst to encourage companies such as
GARMIN to invest in general aviation. 78 Opponents of the
GARA bill suspected that its enactment would mean that the
new planes would not be safe. Exactly the opposite result has
occurred. For example, Unison Industries has developed at
least five new safety products since GARA was enacted. "None of
aircraft ownership called fractional ownership, in which individuals or companies
purchase a share in an aircraft for their occasional use. See GAO General Avia-
tion Report, supra note 5, at 4, 6.
72 See id. at 13 (citing WILBUR SMITIi ASSOCIATES & APPLIED MANAGEMENT SOLU-
TIONS, INC., The Economic Impact Of Civil Aviation On The U.S. Economy -
2000 (Mar. 2000) (prepared for FAA and MCA Research Corp.) and WILBUR
SMITii ASSOCIATES, THE ECONOMIC IMPACT OF CIVILt AvIATION ON THE U.S. ECON-
OMY (June 1989)).
73 GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 13.
74 See id. at 28.
75 See General Aviation Manufacturers Association, Report to the President and
Congress: The Results of the General Aviation Revitalization Act (1996).
76 See GAO General Aviation &eport, supra note 5, at 4.
77 See id. at 28.
78 Five Year Results, supra note 67.
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our new developments would have been done without it," said
President Frederick B. Sontag."'
General aviation flying activity indicators such as hours flown
and number of pilot licenses also rose after the enactment of
GARA.811 Robert Baker, vice chairman of American Airlines,
Inc., said, "The commercial airline industry draws the majority
of its pilots from general aviation. We need a healthy general
aviation industry producing pilots."'" At the same time, the
safety of general aviation has been improving. The total num-
ber of accidents declined from 3,233 in 1982 to 1,989 in 1998 -
a decrease of 41 percent - while the accident rate fell from
about 10 to about 7 accidents for every 100,000 flight hours.82
IV. WHAT DOES GARA DO?
GARA is elegant in its simplicity. Simply put, it is "a classic
statute of repose." 3 Under GARA, a person can sue the manu-
facturer of a general aviation aircraft for injuries that occur any-
time in the 18 years after the date that the plane is placed into
the stream of commerce. 4 If an accident occurs one day before
the GARA period runs, an action will be possible and will be
governed by the usual statute of limitations. If it occurs on the
day after the GARA period runs, no action is possible."
This represents a policy judgment by Congress that the air-
craft is considered to be not defective or not negligently de-
signed as a matter of law if it has been in successful use for
almost two decades before the accident. If a general aviation
aircraft has flown safely for 18 years and is involved in an acci-
v. Id. Sontag testified before Congress in 1993 that Unison scrapped an ad-
vanced electronic ignition project for light aircraft because the company was con-
cerned about the liability risk. See The General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1993:
Hearings on H.R. 3087 Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on Public
Works & Transp., 103d Cong. (1993) (statement of Frederick B. Sontag, President
of Unison Industries).
80 See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 4, 33.
s See Five Year Results, supra note 67.
82 See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 5.
83 Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078, 1084 (9th Cir. 2001).
84 A statute of repose is different from a statute of limitations. A statute of
limitations provides a set time after the injury or discovery of the injury for a
lawsuit to be filed. Some so-called statutes of repose measure their time periods
from the date of delivery of the product (or occurrence of the act) to the time of
the filing of the lawsuit, rather than the time of the accident when the injury
occurred. Such statutes often appear in conjunction with statutes of limitation
and are hybrids between repose and limitation statutes.
85 Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1084.
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dent after this period, it is highly likely that the cause of that
accident was not related to the aircraft's warnings or design.,6
Rather, the highly probable causes are pilot error, improper
modification or maintenance by fixed-based operators (such as
repair and service personnel), weather, or other causes. A study
by the General Accounting Office found that more than two-
thirds of general aviation accidents between 1994 and 1998 were
caused by pilot error, including mistakes related to procedure,
skill, and judgment.8" Mechanical failures were involved in 13
percent of the fatal accidents and 25 percent of the nonfatal
accidents.8 8 The remaining accidents were due to other factors
such as misdirections from air traffic control.8 9
Congress recognized that components of general aviation air-
craft are from time to time replaced, and therefore GARA pro-
vides an 18-year "rolling statute of repose" for new or
replacement parts. Under this provision, the repose period for
claims based on injuries relating to the new part begins running
on the date the replacement or addition is completed, while
claims for injuries based on the rest of the aircraft are subject to
the original statute of repose.
GARA includes four exceptions to the statute of repose. First
is an exception for fraud. This exception applies where the
manufacturer knowingly misrepresented, withheld or concealed
certain information during the regulatory process. The next
two exceptions focus on potential plaintiffs who did not make
the decision to ride on the aircraft: the "medical emergency"
exception and the "not aboard the aircraft" exception. Finally,
Congress created the "warranty" exception in recognition of the
fact that a manufacturer and a purchaser of a general aviation
aircraft may wish to negotiate a longer warranty.9 ° GARA's stat-
ute of repose provides meaningful national protection. It
preempts state law to the extent state law provides for a longer
86 The statute of repose approach was particularly appropriate for addressing
the general aviation industry's downturn. By the time most general aviation air-
craft are 15 years old they have had at least three major engine overhauls and
have accumulated 6,000 hours of flying time. "The theory of the statute of repose
is that such use ought to demonstrate the safety of the basic design." Donlan,
supra note 40, at 10.
87 See GAO General Aviation Report, supra note 5, at 8, 53-55.
88 See id.
89 See id.
90 GARA, § 2(b).
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period of repose, but does not displace a state statute of repose
that provides for a shorter period.91
V. WHO CAN INVOKE GARA?
The protection provided by GARA is limited to manufacturers
of general aviation aircraft and their component parts. There-
fore, in order to invoke the statute of repose, defendants must
meet certain threshold requirements set forth in the statute.
They must be manufacturers of general aviation aircraft or their
component parts, and, at the time of the accident, the aircraft
must not have been engaged in "scheduled passenger-carrying
operations." Defendants who satisfy these requirements should
plead GARA as an affirmative defense.92
A. WHO IS A "MANUFACTURER"?
GARA can be asserted only by manufacturers of general avia-
tion aircraft or component parts, not by other entities.93 To
date, courts have rejected attempts by plaintiffs to narrowly de-
fine "manufacturer" as the original manufacturer and thus nar-
rowly restrict the application of the statute of repose. As a
result, successors-in-interest to the original manufacturer have
been allowed to raise the GARA defense,94 as have agents of the
manufacturer. 95 Arguably, other entities that satisfy state law def-
initions of "manufacturer" may be able to raise the defense as
wellU' 6
!I Id. § 2(d).
92 In Tucker v. Hiller Aviation, No. CV 752984 (Cal. Super. Ct., Santa Clara Cty.,
May 2, 2000), the court denied Textron Lycoming's motion for summary judg-
ment based on GARA because the defendant failed to raise the GARA defense in
its Answer. The defendant alleged only that the case was barred by the statute of
limitations.
93 GARA § 2(a).
94 See, e.g., Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124; Mason v. Saddler, No. LACV
032793 (Iowa Dist. Ct., Linn Cty., Feb. 23, 2000).
95 See, e.g., Butler v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., No. BC 206780 (consoli-
dated) (L.A. Super. Ct., Apr. 16, 2001).
96 In Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., No. C98-5579RJB (W.D. Wash. Feb.
14, 2000), the court looked to state law in determining that Bell was the manufac-
turer of the military surplus helicopter at issue. Bell had originally manufactured
the helicopter for the Navy. Id. at 9 (holding that "[a]pplying the law set forth in
Issue 2, above [RCW 7.72.010(1) and (2)], the record is clear that Bell is the
manufacturer of the helicopter at issue here.").
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1. Successor Manufacturers
Plaintiffs have argued that only the actual manufacturer of the
allegedly defective product or part can assert the GARA defense,
not "successor manufacturers," such as companies that bought
out a manufacturer's product lines.97 This argument has met
with little success. Courts have allowed successor defendants to
rely on GARA. Judges have acknowledged that GARA will be
eviscerated if its protections are not extended to the successors
of the actual manufacturers. This result is consistent with the
statute's legislative history, which shows that Congress knew the
aviation industry was going through a series of mergers and ac-
quisitions and chose not to exempt successors from the reach of
GARA.98 This result is also consistent with state court decisions
applying statutes of repose to bar claims against successor manu-
facturers when the claim against the original manufacturer is
barred ."
In deciding whether a defendant should be considered to be
a "manufacturer," courts have looked to whether that defendant
has to comply with FAA regulations imposing duties on the man-
ufacturer. This is reasonable, as GARA incorporates FAA regula-
97 S ee, e.g., Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124; Mason v. Saddler, No. LACV 032793,
at 4.
98 For example, Sen. Hollings, a principal opponent to GARA, argued that the
"industry is doing extremely well." 140 CONG. REC. S2438-02 (1994). By way of
example, he stated that "Cessna has been bought out by Textron.... Beech
Aircraft, Raytheon bought it .... " Id. Similarly, David Katzman, a leading plain-
tiffs' aviation attorney, testified before the House Public Works Committee:
"Cessna is owned by Textron. It was recently sold to Textron, I believe, by Gen-
eral Dynamics for something to the tune of $100 million." General Aviation Revi-
talization Act of 1993: Hearing Before the Subcomm. on Aviation of the House Comm. on
Public Works & Transp., 103d Cong. 70 (1993).
99 See, e.g., Allison v. ITE Imperial Corp., 729 F. Supp. 45, 46 (S.D. Miss. 1990)
(finding that the Tennessee statute of repose bars claims against the manufac-
turer's successor); Henry v. Raynor Mfg. Co., 753 F. Supp. 278, 279-80 (D. Minn.
1990) (finding that the Minnesota statute of repose bars claims against the manu-
facturer's successor); Gardener v. Navistar Int'l Transp. Corp., 571 N.E.2d 1107,
1108, 1114 (Ill. App. 1991) (finding that the Illinois statute of repose bars claims
against the manufacturer's successor); Frankenmuth Mut. Ins. Co. v. Marlette
Homes, Inc., 573 N.W.2d 611, 612 n.1 (Mich. 1998) (noting that the Michigan
statute of repose bars claims against the manufacturer's successors); Jackson v.
Coldspring Terrace Property Owners Ass'n, 939 S.W.2d 762, 764, 768-69 (Tex.
App. 1997, writ denied) (stating that the Texas statute of repose bars claims
against a franchise when claims against the franchisee manufacturer are barred).
Accord Denman v. Snapper Division, 131 F.3d 546, 547 (5th Cir. 1998) (stating
that the North Carolina statute of repose bars claims against the manufacturer's
successor).
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tions throughout its statutory scheme. For example, GARA
explicitly incorporates FAA regulations in determining what is a
general aviation aircraft.'0 0 Moreover, one of the GARA excep-
tions involves instances where a manufacturer has knowingly
misrepresented or concealed from the FAA "required informa-
tion" relating to "obligations with respect to continuing airwor-
thiness" of an aircraft.'0 ' The application of this exception
requires a court to determine whether a given defendant had
the obligation to comply with relevant FAA regulations.
Therefore, in Burroughs,"2 the plaintiffs alleged that a mal-
functioning 25-year-old carburetor caused the airplane crash.
They sued an aircraft parts manufacturer that did not manufac-
ture or sell the carburetor model at issue. The defendant had
merely acquired the carburetor product line from its predeces-
sor, which in turn had acquired the product line from the actual
manufacturer. The California appellate court ruled that the de-
fendant-successor was a "manufacturer" for purposes of GARA,
and upheld the trial court's grant of summary judgment."' - The
court explained that although the defendant did not actually
manufacture the carburetor, it had taken over the manufac-
turer's regulatory responsibilities for the product line at issue.
The court said:
GARA contains an implicit recognition that as a matter of federal
law, by virtue of the extensive rules and regulations governing
the aviation industry, a successor manufacturer steps into the
shoes of the predecessor with regard to the duties of reporting
defects ... The federal regulatory scheme contemplates that at
all times there will be a designated OEM [original equipment
manufacturer] for an aircraft part or component, burdened with
the reporting duties and responsibilities as to that particular
product. 104
Because the defendant-successor had become the entity re-
sponsible for issuing maintenance manuals and bulletins and
fulfilling the manufacturer's obligations for continued airworthi-
ness, the court said, "[i]n the eyes of the FAA, [the defendant-
successor] was the 'new manufacturer' of the ... carburetor."''0 5
100 See GARA, § 2(c).
,m See id. § 2 (b)(1).
102 Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124.
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The court also rejected plaintiffs' argument that the rules of
successor liability under California law applied and allowed the
claim. The court refused to interpret GARA by reference to
state law: "Because of the preemptive reach of GARA ... Califor-
nia law relating to successor liability does not govern if it would
allow a claim otherwise barred by GARA."' 6 Otherwise, the
court said, GARA would be subject to the vagaries of differing
state statutes and the uniform protection created by the Act
would be nullified.10 7
2. Agents of Manufacturers
In Butler v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., plaintiffs filed suit for
injuries arising out of a helicopter crash allegedly caused by a
defective tail rotor yoke assembly. 0 8 The "retirement life" of
the helicopter's tail rotor yoke was increased during the repose
period from 4,000 hours to 5,000 hours. Because of this change,
a 4,000-hour yoke that had been retired from use was tested and
reinstalled on the helicopter one year before the accident. In
addition to suing the helicopter manufacturer, plaintiffs sued an
individual and a company that tested the yoke to determine
whether to extend its useful life. Drawing an analogy to the Bur-
roughs court's use of GARA to bar claims against a successor
manufacturer, the Butler court rejected the plaintiff's arguments
that these two defendants were not entitled to rely on GARA
because they did not manufacture the helicopter involved in the
accident. The Butler court explained: "[I] n acting with regard to
providing for testing the yoke for the purpose of possibly ex-
tending its retirement life, they were performing acts as agents
for [the manufacturer]. Had [the manufacturer] done the
work itself, such conduct would constitute performance of func-
tions as a manufacturer."' 9
3. Distributors, Sellers, Lessors
GARA does not explicitly include general aviation aircraft dis-
tributors, sellers and lessors, but, under state law, such entities
may be able to assert all defenses available to the manufacturer,
106 Id. at 132 n.7.
107 See id.
108 Butler v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., No. BC 206780 (consolidated) (L.A.
Super. Ct. Apr. 16, 2001), at 3.
lob Id. at 8.
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including GARA."I0 (This assumes that the defendants also can
establish they are acting in the capacity of a manufacturer, as
required by the statute.''') Some states may include all entities
in the chain of distribution in their definition of manufacturer
for products liability purposes. For example, the term "manu-
facturer" is defined under the California Business and Profes-
sions Code to include any "distributor of a manufacturer who
sells, transfers, or exchanges an appliance to or with a re-
tailer. ' "2 Defendants meeting that definition could argue that
GARA protections apply to them as well. Moreover, a number
of states also have their own statutes of repose that may be as-
serted by non-manufacturers in the chain of distribution. 1 3
Similarly, non-OEM rebuilders and overhaulers who rebuild
component parts such as engines and thus return them to their
original specifications may be treated in some states as manufac-
turers for purposes of strict liability law." 4 Most states do not
recognize strict liability claims filed against defendants who
merely performed repairs, but they do recognize strict liability
claims against dealers."'1
4. Manufacturer Acting in its Capacity as a Manufacturer
GARA applies only if the lawsuit is brought against a manufac-
turer in its capacity as a manufacturer.'" The House Judiciary
Committee Report explained that this "is intended to ensure
that parties who happen to be manufacturers of an aircraft or a
component part are not immunized from liability they may be
subject to in some other capacity."'"II Increasingly, manufactur-
ers are becoming involved in certain maintenance programs re-
I l See Robert F. Hedrick, A Close and Critical Analysis of the New General Aviation
Revitalization Act, 62J. AIR L. & CoM. 385, 397 (1996)
II See supra note 93.
12 CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE § 22410(b) (West 1987).
13 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 397; see also McNatt & England, supra note
50, at 327-42 (listing state statutes of repose in effect at the time GARA passed).
114 See Anderson v. Olmstead Util. Equip. Inc., 573 N.E.2d 626, 629 (Ohio
1991) (stating "strict liability applies with equal force to a commercial entity en-
gaged in remanufacturing or rebuilding a defective product"); Michalko v.
Cooke Color & Chem. Corp., 451 A.2d 179, 182 (N.J. 1982) (stating that a party
who "undertakes to rebuild part of a machine in accordance with the specifica-
tions of the owner" can be held strictly liable).
115 Some have argued that GARA prevents dealers from spreading their dam-
ages to manufacturers through joint and several liability. See Kister, supra note
13, at 114-15; Hedrick, supra note 110 at 404 n.94 (listing jurisdictions).
I 1 GARA § 2(a).
17 H. R. REp. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 7.
1290
2002] THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT 1291
lated to their own aircraft, and many component part
manufacturers offer overhaul and rebuilding services. 18 Con-
gress recognized this, explaining that, under GARA, "[flor ex-
ample, in the event a party who happened to be a manufacturer
committed some negligent act as a mechanic of an aircraft or as
a pilot, and such act was a proximate cause of an accident, the
victims would not be barred from bringing a civil suit for dam-
ages against that party in its capacity as a mechanic."' 19
In Burroughs, the court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that
their claim was based on Precision's allegedly negligent service,
maintenance, and repair of the carburetor.' 2° The court ac-
knowledged that "if the manufacturer committed a negligent act
repairing or servicing an aircraft or as a pilot, and such act was
the proximate cause of an accident, the victims would not be
barred from bringing suit against the manufacturer acting in a
capacity other than as a manufacturer."'' 2 The court observed,
however, that plaintiffs' pleadings and arguments focused on
Precision's role and duties as a manufacturer. The court's review
of the record found no evidence that Precision ever acted in any
capacity other than as a manufacturer carrying out its obliga-
tions to ensure airworthiness.122
In Mason v. Saddler, the plaintiff sought to avoid GARA by
characterizing Schweizer, a defendant (a successor to the origi-
nal helicopter manufacturer), as a "maintenance support en-
tity."'1 23 The plaintiff argued that the crash was proximately
caused by Schweizer's negligent failure to include certain infor-
mation in its maintenance support materials. The Iowa state
court found that Schweizer was a manufacturer entitled to assert
the GARA defense because Schweizer had assumed the duties of
the manufacturer of the helicopter when it acquired the type
certificate for the aircraft from the original manufacturer. 124
The court rejected plaintiff's argument that the rolling statute
of repose did not bar his claims for failure to warn. The court
cited a line of cases holding that claims for failure to warn of a
design flaw are subject to a statute of repose in the same way
1i8 See AVIATION WK. & SPACE TECH., Mar. 11, 1996, at 44-53.
19 H. R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 7.
120 Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 124.
121 Id. at 131.
122 Id.
123 Mason v. Saddler, No. LACV 032793, at 4.
124 Id. at 6.
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that claims for the design flaw would be. 12 5 The case is currently
on appeal. 26 In another case, Schneider v. Cessna Aircraft Co., 12 7
the court simply stated that service manuals "are issued 'in the
capacity as a manufacturer' because a manufacturer's provision
of maintenance and repair manuals is part of the duty to warn as
a manufacturer. Any other interpretation would circumvent
GARA providing a back door to sue for a design flaw. ' 128 We
agree that these decisions find support in the legislative purpose
of GARA.
B. WHAT IS A "GENERAL AVIATION AIRCRAFT"?
Only general aviation aircraft are subject to GARA. The stat-
ute defines general aviation aircraft as:
any aircraft for which a type certificate or an airworthiness certifi-
cate has been issued by the Administrator of the Federal Aviation
Administration, which, at the time such certificate was originally
issued, had a maximum seating capacity of fewer than 20 passen-
gers, and which was not, at the time of the accident, engaged in
scheduled passenger-carrying operations as defined under regu-
lations in effect under the Federal Aviation Act of 1958 ... at the
time of the accident. 129
1. Type and Airworthiness Certificates
One commentator has noted that GARA can be applicable to
a particular aircraft so long as a type or airworthiness certificate
was originally issued by the FAA - even if the certificate is sus-
pended or revoked. 1 ' This appears clear from the statutory lan-
guage and, according to the commentator, by the fact that the
manufacturer does not keep control over the continuing airwor-
thiness of its aircraft after it is delivered to another party. '
125 Id. at 9; see infra note 234 and accompanying text.
6 Mason v. Schweizer Aircraft Corp., No. 00-1231 (Iowa. 2000).
127 Schneider v. Cessna Aircraft Co., No. 542343 (Cal. Super. Ct., Sacramento
Cty. July 26, 1996) (consolidated).
128 Id. at 3; see also Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 531, 541
n.5 (S.D. Tex 1996) (stating that under applicable state law and Section 324A of
the Restatement (Second) of Torts, "the provision of maintenance and repair
instructions is not a separate and discreet post-sale undertaking creating a sepa-
rate cause of action, but rather part of the manufacturer's duty to warn").
129 GARA, §2(c).
130 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 390. Hedrick, now an aviation law practi-
tioner in Washington state, provides a thorough analysis of GARA's definitional
provisions in his article. Hedrick, supra note 110, at 388-93.
131 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 390.
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Type certificates are issued for aircraft, aircraft engines, pro-
pellers and certain other parts 1 2 once the FAA has approved
the "design, specifications, and manufacturing process"' 13' and
determined that each submitted part "is properly designed and
manufactured, performs properly, and meets the regulations
and minimum standards prescribed."' 34 Manufacturers have the
responsibility to make sure the parts at issue fully comply with
the type certificate.' 35
Airworthiness certificates are issued for an aircraft when the
FAA "finds that the aircraft conforms to its type certificate and,
after inspection, is in condition for safe operation."'' 3 6 They are
issued "upon request from an aircraft's registered owner, who is
typically the manufacturer before the initial sale of the
aircraft." 3
7
2. Maximum Seating Capacity
At the time the original airworthiness or type certificate was
issued, the aircraft must have had a maximum seating capacity
of fewer than 20 passengers.1"' This information is usually in-
cluded in the type certificate documentation.'' Pilots and
flight crew are not considered to be "passengers" under federal
aviation regulations. 40
3. Not Engaged in Scheduled Passenger-Carrying Operations
The regulations in effect at the time of the accident in ques-
tion establish whether or not the aircraft was engaged in "sched-
uled passenger-carrying operations" when the accident took
place.' 4 ' The court in Reynolds v. Textron, Inc. looked to Part 135
13 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a)(1) (1994).
'33 Hedrick, supra note 110, at 390.
.34 49 U.S.C. § 44704(a) (1).
135 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 390.
16 49 U.S.C. § 44704(d).
137 Hedrick, supra note 110, at 390.
138 See GARA, § (2)(c).
139 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 391-92.
140 "Passenger seating configuration" means: "[T] he total number of seats for
which the aircraft is type certificated that can be made available for passenger use
aboard a flight and includes that seat in certain airplanes which may be used by a
representative of the Administrator to conduct flight checks but is available for
revenue purposes on other occasions." 14 C.F.R. § 129.25(a)(3) (1996).
141 GARA § (2) (c).
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of the Code of Federal Regulations, 142 which defines the term as
"passenger-carrying operations that are conducted in accor-
dance with a published schedule [,] which covers at least five
round trips per week on at least one route between two or more
points, includes dates or times (or both), and is openly adver-
tised or otherwise made readily available to the general
public."'14 3
VI. HOW DOES GARA WORK?
A. TRIGGER OF 18-YEAR REPOSE PERIOD
GARA's 18-year repose period begins to run either upon the
date of delivery of the aircraft to its first purchaser or lessee if it
comes directly from the manufacturer, or on the date of first
delivery to a person engaged in the business of selling or leasing
such aircraft.' 44 The repose period on replacement or addi-
tional parts begins to run on the date the replacement or addi-
tion is completed.145
142 143 Findings of Fact and Conclusions of Law Relating to Defendant AVCO
Corporation's Motion for Summary Judgment at 2, Reynolds v. Textron, Inc.,
Case No. 3AN-96-6352 (Alaska Sup. Ct., Jan. 20, 1999) [hereinafter "Reynolds,
Findings of Fact"].
143 14 C.F.R. § 135.261(b)(1)(1996).
44 GARA § 2(a)(1). See, e.g., Reynolds, Findings of Fact, at 9 ("Here, the origi-
nal Lycoming engine and its component parts were installed in an aircraft in
1968 that was delivered to its first purchaser in 1969 or 1970, more than 18 years
before the accident. Accordingly, GARA precludes claims against Textron
Lycoming relating to the original engine and its components."); Altseimer v. Bell
Helicopter Textron Inc., 919 F. Supp. 340, 342 (E.D. Cal. 1996) (finding that GARA
bars claims where the defendant provided "undisputed evidence" that the heli-
copter, the gearbox, and the components of the gearbox that purportedly caused
a crash all were more than 18 years old at the time of the crash); Carr v. United
Technologies Corp., No. CIV 152495 (Cal. Super. Ct., Ventura Cty., Aug. 30,
1996) (finding that claims against aircraft and component part manufacturers
are barred by GARA where the plane was delivered and the engines were in-
stalled more than 18 years before an accident); Barkley v. Textron Lycoming,
Inc., Case No. 34031 (Cal. Super. Ct. Stanislaus Cty., Sept. 18, 1996) (finding that
GARA bars claims where the aircraft was delivered to the first non-broker cus-
tomer more than 18 years prior to the accident at issue). A pro-plaintiff com-
mentator has argued that, despite the clear federal statutory language, the "date
of delivery" should be determined under state law. Some states use the date that
a product was first used for its intended purpose as the triggering date for stat-
utes of repose, see, e.g., CoLo. RE'. SrAT. § 13-80-107 (2001), while other states
use the date on which the manufacturer relinquished its control of the product,
see CONN. GEN. STAT. § 52-577a (2001).
145 GARA § 2(a)(2); see Reynolds, Findings of Fact, at 9 ("GARA § 2(a)(2)
prescribes a separate 18-year limitation period for new replacement parts and
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Determining the start date for the statute of repose should be
a straightforward process. Courts in one state, though, had
clouded the issue when dealing with accidents involving surplus
military aircraft-especially helicopters.
Military aircraft typically are manufactured for direct sale to
the military. When the military is done with them, the Defense
Department sells them into the civilian market as surplus.
These surplus aircraft are very low priced, and they are often
used for tasks involving repeated heavy lifts (such as logging) for
which they were not designed. 14 As a result, surplus military
helicopters have a much higher accident rate than those exper-
ienced in general by turbine helicopters. 147 Even though the
aircraft are being used in jobs for which they were not designed,
the original aircraft manufacturer may be sued if the aircraft
crashes.
When a military aircraft is being used by the military, it may
not meet GARA's definition of a "general aviation aircraft." Re-
call that in order to be a "general aviation aircraft" under GARA,
the aircraft must have been issued a "type certificate" or an "air-
worthiness certificate" by the Federal Aviation Administration. 148
But military aircraft are not required to have FAA-issued type
certificates. The FAA certification requirement kicks in when
the Defense Department sells its used aircraft into the civilian
market. Once the aircraft is FAA-certified, it qualifies as a gen-
eral aviation aircraft under GARA (assuming the rest of the stat-
utory requirements are met).
GARA's express language requires that for the statute of re-
pose to apply, the aircraft must be a general aviation aircraft at
the time of the "accident."'149 Section 2(a) states that "no civil
action for damages . . . arising out of an accident involving a
general aviation aircraft may be brought" if the repose period has
elapsed. 5" If an aircraft is a general aviation aircraft at the time
of the accident, the 18-year statute of repose should start to run
at the time of its initial delivery-regardless of whether the air-
components that begins to run on the date of the completion of the
replacement.").
146 See Brian Rettman, Impact of Surplus Military Helicopters, ROTOR, Winter 1997-
98, at 34.
147 See id. (reporting that the accident rate for UH-ls in military service is 1.7
accidents per 100,000 flying hours, while the accident rate for surplus UH-ls is 26
accidents per 100,000 flying hours).
148 GARA § 2(c).
149 GARA § 2(a).
150 Id. (emphasis added).
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craft "started life" as a military aircraft or a civilian aircraft.
GARA does not contain any provision that disqualifies former
military aircraft from GARA or that delays commencement of
the statue of repose until a type certificate has been obtained
from the FAA. The statue does not require the aircraft to meet
the definition of a general aviation aircraft when it is delivered
to its first purchaser. This approach carries out the statutory
language and reflects the understanding of both GARA's propo-
nents and opponents that the statute of repose would cover mili-
tary aircraft. "
While this seems straightforward, some lower courts in Wash-
ington state ruled that the repose period for surplus military air-
craft starts to run only once the used aircraft is sold into the
civilian market. 1 2 This can take place many years after the air-
craft was initially delivered to its first purchaser, the military.
The United States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit re-
solved this hotly contested issue in Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Tex-
tron, Inc.l15 1 In Kennedy, the Ninth Circuit ruled that the repose
15, During Senate floor debates on the bill that proposed a 15-year repose pe-
riod and eventually became GARA, Sen. Heflin (one of the principal opponents
of GARA) stated: "It would appear to me that this bill might not have as much
opposition if it was limited to piston-powered aircraft. But included in it are jets,
helicopters, military planes .. " 140 CONG. REC. S2452-02 (1994). Sen. Kas-
senbaum (the principal sponsor of GARA in the Senate) stated that the repose
period, "when you have gone without a manufacturing or design defect, applies
the same to piston-powered orjet-powered. I think that whether it is in the mili-
tary or civilian, if you have flown a plane for 15 years and there has not been a
defect, then clearly the plane is going to survive." Id. She also rejected the argu-
ment that military aircraft should not be protected by GARA on the ground that
they are not kept in adequate repair. She said: "I think that the military is going
to keep their planes in good repair. They are constantly being flown. During any
stress tests, if they show a part needs to be replaced, it will be replaced, and a new
15-year statute of repose would go into effect." Id.
152 See, e.g., Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. C98-5579RJB, at 7-8 (re-
jecting a GARA defense on the ground that the trigger date for the repose period
is when a surplus aircraft is delivered to the civilian market); Worman v. Bell
Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 98-2-01377-7 (Thurston Cty. Super.Ct., Mar. 3,
2000) (same).
15:1 Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc, 283 F.3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002).
See also Butler, No. BC 206780, at 4 (noting in dicta that a former military helicop-
ter that crashed during a municipal emergency rescue mission "was first sold and
delivered [to the Los Angeles Fire Department] 22 years before the accident").
For further discussion of this issue, see Robert F. Hedrick, Are Surplus Military
Aircraft and Parts Afforded GARA Protection ?, 13-SUM AIR & SPACE LAw 10-14 (1998)
(presenting arguments as to why GARA should not apply to claims involving sur-
plus military aircraft); Frederick C. Schafrick, Caselaw Developments under the Gen-
eral Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994: The First Five Years, The 1999 Aviation
Litigation Seminar, Aviation and Space Law Comm. of the Tort and Insurance
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period begins to run when the aircraft is initially delivered to the
military-not when it is eventually sold into the civilian market.
In Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., a surplus military heli-
copter crashed during logging operations. The crash occurred
26 years after the helicopter was delivered to the military-but
only 11 years after it was sold to a civilian business.154 The fed-
eral district court denied the defendant's motion for summary
judgment under GARA, ruling that the statute of repose had not
yet run. 55 The lower court said the statute of repose could only
be triggered once the aircraft is designated a general aviation
aircraft, i.e., when the helicopter is sold into the civilian market
and receives its first type and airworthiness certificates.'15  Be-
cause only 11 years had passed between the FAA-certification of
the surplus helicopter at issue and the accident, the court said,
GARA did not bar the lawsuit. 
157
The Ninth Circuit rejected the district court's approach. Af-
ter finding that appeal of the GARA ruling was appropriate at
this stage of the lawsuit, 58 the Ninth Circuit ruled that the
"plain language" of GARA required that the repose period is
triggered by the initial delivery of the aircraft, even if the aircraft
cannot be considered a general aviation aircraft at that time. 
15
'
As the Ninth Circuit explained, the statute provides that the
limitation period starts running from "the date of delivery of the
aircraft to its first purchaser . . .I6 Section 3(1) of GARA de-
fines the meaning of the term "aircraft" as used in GARA as
broader than the term "general aviation aircraft." GARA pro-
Law Practice Section of the American Bar Assoc., at 15 (Washington, D.C., Oct.
21-22, 1999) (stating that military aircraft more than 18 years old should qualify
for the GARA defense).
154 Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. C98-557-9RJB, at 3.
155 Id. at 7-8. The status of the defendant asserting the GARA defense, Bell
Helicopter, was also contested. Bell urged that it was not a product seller or
manufacturer under Washington state law. See Defendant-Appellant's Brief, at
36, Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 283 F. 3d 1107 (9th Cir. 2002) (No.
00-35240).
156 Kennedy, No. C98-557-9RJB, at 7-8.
157 Id.
158 See Kennedy, 283 F.3d at 1110-11 (stating that appellate jurisdiction exists for
review of GARA ruling under the collateral order doctrine; GARA ruling was con-
clusive, resolved an important question "completely separate" from the merits,
and was effectively unreviewable on appeal from a final judgment in the underly-
ing case because the manufacturer would irretrievably lose its statutory right not
to stand trial).
159 Id. at 1112.
160 Id. at 1111 (quoting GARA § 2(a)(1)(A)).
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vides explicitly that "aircraft has the meaning given such term in
section 40102(a) (6) of Title 49, United States Code . . ." That
provision defines "aircraft" as "any contrivance invented, used,
or designed to navigate, or fly in, the air." 49 U.S.C.
§ 40102(a) (6).161 Further, the Ninth Circuit explained that an
aircraft cannot fulfill GARA's definition of general aviation air-
craft at the time of delivery because one requirement of the defi-
nition is that it "was not, at the time of the accident, engaged in
scheduled passenger-carrying operations."162 Instead, the GARA
definition can only be satisfied once the accident has occurred
and the other requirements are met.
One of the fundamental principles of GARA is that when an
aircraft operates without incident for 18 years, its proven record
suggests that there is no product defect. Congress wanted to
shield manufacturers from costly litigation when the aircraft had
a lengthy track record of safety. The Ninth Circuit's opinion in
Kennedy helps further this public policy goal.
B. TRIGGER OF "ROLLING" STATUTE OF REPOSE FOR
REPLACEMENT PARTS
GARA provides for a "rolling" statute of repose with regard to
replacement parts. When a new part is added to the aircraft, or
replaces an old part, the statute of repose starts all over again
with regard to that part.163 As one court said, "[s]ince almost
every major component of the aircraft will be replaced over its
lifetime, the 'rolling' aspect of the statute of repose was in-
tended to provide that victims and their families would have re-
course against the manufacturer of the new component part in
the event of a defect in the new part causing an accident."1 "4
If the additional or replacement part is a used part, though,
the statute of limitations with regard to that used part should
continue to run. Rep. Glickman, one of GARA's original spon-
sors, explained during the House debate that "a used propeller
which has 3 years left on its applicable limitation period would
161 Id. (quoting GARA § 3(1)).
162 Id.
16-3 See Flores v. Ram Aircraft Corp., No. 96-1507-CIV (S.D. Fla. Sept. 2, 2000)
(denying summary judgment on GARA grounds where defendant failed to ad-
dress plaintiffs claims that a defective component part that contributed to the
accident was added to the engine during an overhaul within the repose period,
even though defendant had uncontroverted evidence the engine itself was de-
liver more than 18 years before case was filed).
164 Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 131-32.
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still have only 3 years, if installed in its used condition on a dif-
ferent airplane." '165 In Butler, the court refused to re-start the
repose period where the used part that allegedly caused the ac-
cident was added to the plane one year before the accident. 66
The part's retirement life had been extended and the part was
reinstalled. The court stated that this "cannot be considered the
installation of a new part because it is the precise opposite of
that." 167
When the rolling statute of repose provision is triggered, suit
is authorized only against the manufacturer of the replacement
part, not against the manufacturers of the airframe or other
components. 168 In Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin Corp.,169 the plain-
tiffs argued that the replacement of component parts during the
repose period triggered a new time frame that was applicable
not only to the component part manufacturers but also to the
plane's manufacturer. 17  The court disagreed, relying on the
legislative history that provided: "Since the bill provides for a
'rolling' statute of repose, victims and their families will have
recourse against new component part manufacturers for a part in-
stalled subsequent to delivery in the event of a crash attributable
to a structural defect or similar flaw in a new component
part. ' 171 The Court's decision reflects both the letter of and
public policy behind GARA.
C. EXCEPTIONS TO GARA
GARA provides four exceptions to the statute of repose: the
fraud exception, the medical emergency exception, the not
aboard the aircraft exception, and the written warranty excep-
tion. The latter three exceptions are relatively straightforward.
165 140 CONG. REC. H4998-02 (1994).
166 Butler, No. BC 206780, at 9.
167 Id.
168 See H. R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2.
169 Campbell v. Parker-Hannifin Corp., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202 (Cal. Ct. App.
2002).
170 See id. at 209.
171 Id. (quoting H. R. REP. No. 103-525,pt.2 (emphasis in original)). See also
Davenport v. Precision Airmotive, No. SC-041-139, at 3 (Cal. Super. Ct., L.A. Cty.
Feb. 21, 1997) (granting summaryjudgment despite plaintiffs argument that de-
fendant Textron-Lycoming could not assert GARA because it did not manufac-
ture the allegedly defective components at issue, and stating that "no reason is
advanced why Textron-Lycoming should remain in the case .... There is noth-
ing . . .to indicate that these [allegedly defective] components were manufac-
tured by Textron-Lycoming.").
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1. Medical Emergency Exception
The medical emergency exception is designed to provide ad-
ditional protection to certain people who had no choice about
being on the aircraft, such as accident victims being airlifted to a
hospital for emergency treatment. While the statutory language
says "medical or other emergency," GARA's legislative history
makes clear that its purpose was to protect medical emergency
patients. Still, given the plain language of the statute, it is likely
that a person having been rescued from a flood or similar emer-
gency could invoke the exception.
Pilots, flight engineers, and flight navigators are considered
"flight crew" and thus cannot invoke the medical emergency ex-
ception. 7 2 Some commentators have argued that paramedics
on a MedEvac aircraft should be able to invoke the exception
along with the patients. '7 The public policy behind the law sug-
gests that this exception is limited to those who are aboard the
helicopter for receiving treatment, not those who are aboard for
providing treatment, since the provision is intended to apply to
people who did not freely choose to fly aboard the aircraft. A
California trial court understood this public policy when it ap-
plied GARA in a case that arose out of a crash of a Los Angeles
Fire Department helicopter carrying an accident victim. 174 The
court explicitly noted that GARA's medical emergency excep-
tion applied to the claims of the accident victim, but granted
summary judgment to the defendant with regard to claims by
the paramedics as well as the flight crew. 75
2. "Not on the Plane" Exception
Like the "medical emergency" exception, the "not on the
plane" exception is intended to exempt people who did not
choose to board the aircraft. Recall that a key aspect for passage
of the bill was support by owners and operators of private
planes. Under this exception, if a defective aircraft crashes into
another and injures passengers on the second aircraft, or if it
crashes and injures people on the ground, those persons not on
the defective plane are exempt from the statute of repose.
171 See 14 C.F.R. § 1.1 (1998).
173 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 405-12; Anton, supra note 11, at 794.
17" Butter, No. BC 206780, at 2.
175 I.
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3. Warranty Exception
The warranty exception is intended to recognize those situa-
tions where the manufacturer and the buyer negotiate a longer
safety warranty than the 18-year statute of repose. The legisla-
tive history of GARA states that "in the event a manufacturer
desires to specifically warrant the safety of its product for a pe-
riod of time beyond the applicable statute of repose, the courts
would honour the manufacturer's written warranty."'176 The few
plaintiffs who have raised this exception have generally been un-




The fraud exception has been the most litigated. A key justifi-
cation for the federal government's involvement with GARA and
its protections is its "cradle to grave" oversight of the aviation
industry.'78 The aviation industry is heavily regulated by the fed-
eral government through the FAA certification process. In light
of this comprehensive regulation, open-ended civil liability ex-
posure for general aviation manufacturers was seen as a redun-
dant and heavy-handed use of the judicial system as a deterrent
to the manufacture of unsafe airplanes. 179 As two commentators
have noted:
[t]he FAA's comprehensive requirements of airworthiness and
type certification of each aircraft were determined by Congress
to provide sufficient safeguards, particularly with 18 years of ex-
posure to private, civil liability. Thus, the underlying premise of
the fraud exception is that the protections afforded by GARA are
not to be taken away from a manufacturer unless it can be clearly
shown to have abused the FAA's airworthiness and type certifica-
tion process.'8
176 H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 5-7.
17 See, e.g., Schneider, No. 542343, at 3 (finding that the plaintiff failed to carry
its burden of proving a written warranty existed); Davenport, No. SC-041-139, at 3
(finding that the plaintiff failed to establish the existence of a written warranty);
Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 538 (stating that the plaintiff alleged an express or implied
breach of warranty but dismissing the case on GARA grounds).
178 Oliver &Jones, supra note 50, at 246.
171 H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt 2, at 5-7.
180 Oliver & Jones, supra note 50, at 253.
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a. Substance of the Fraud Exception
The procedural requirements for the issuance of type certifi-
cates and airworthiness certificates are set forth in Part 21 of
FAR. Manufacturers who hold type certificates have a continu-
ing duty to report to the FAA all part failures, malfunctions and
defects they determine have resulted or may result in certain
occurrences listed in the FAR. 8' This information must be re-
ported in order to obtain continuing airworthiness.1 2 This re-
porting requirement is intended to allow the FAA to ensure that
aircraft problems are satisfactorily resolved.
To trigger the fraud exception, the manufacturer must have
"knowingly" misrepresented, withheld, or concealed a certain
type of information. 83 Not all information relating to the air-
craft will implicate the fraud exception. Instead, the fraud ex-
ception may be triggered only where the information at issue is:
"required information that is material and relevant to the per-
formance or the maintenance or operation of such aircraft, or
the component, system, subassembly, or other part, that is caus-
ally related to the harm which the claimant allegedly
suffered." '
b. What is the Appropriate Standard of Intent?
GARA states that the fraud exception applies where the man-
ufacturer has "knowingly misrepresented to the Federal Aviation
Administration, or concealed or withheld from the Federal Avia-
tion Administration, required information.""'
Plaintiffs are required to establish the requisite level of the
manufacturer's intent in order to invoke this exception. Some
have sought to make an issue of whether the word "knowingly"
in the exception modifies "concealed" and "withheld" as well as
"misrepresented." One commentator has suggested otherwise,
stating that "[i]t is important to note that knowingly only pre-
cedes and, thus, only applies to misrepresentation, and not to
the concealment or withholding of information."' 6 The com-
mentator then argues that proof of the mere negligent withhold-
'-] 14 C.F.R. § 21.3(a) (listing types of occurrences).
182 Id. at § 21.1.
183 GARA, § 2(b)(1).
184 hi.
185 Id
18 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 409.
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ing or concealment of information should be enough to trigger
the fraud exception.187
The language chosen by the drafters and the legislative pur-
pose of GARA strongly suggests that proof of scienter is required
as to all three types of fraudulent acts.188 Unlike the verb "to
misrepresent," the verbs "to conceal" and "to withhold" both re-
quire the actor to be acting at least with knowledge, if not with
intent. In including this exception, Congress sought to address
three different situations where a manufacturer could fraudu-
lently make use of the repose period by ensuring the FAA has
misinformation about a particular problem: first, by affirma-
tively misrepresenting the information; second, by withholding
the information, thereby providing misinformation by omission;
and finally, by concealing the information to knowingly provide
misinformation by omission where the information has been af-
firmatively requested. This has been the approach of courts ad-
dressing this exception.18
c. What Acts Constitute Fraud?
Courts considering the fraud exception have generally "got-
ten it right" and interpreted the exception in line with its legisla-
tive purpose. Under these cases, the fraud exception is
triggered only where the particular defendant knowingly mis-
represented or failed to report information required by statute
or requested by the FAA about the aircraft or the component
part at issue, and where the alleged misrepresentation or failure
to report information was both material and causally related to
the accident.
Courts have refused to apply the fraud exception where a de-
fendant was not legally required to provide the FAA with the
information at issue. This sensible approach is consistent with
the statutory language. For example, in Cartman v. Textron
187 Hedrick, supra note 110, at 409. "That is an argument we have faced.... I
can report to you that in Michigan, those judges who have faced that argument
or similar arguments have found it not to be very persuasive, but that is an indica-
tion of the kinds of things that the courts are being asked to look at in order to
avoid the application of GARA." Humphrey, supra note 4, at 176.
188 Statutes are to be interpreted to give effect to congressional intent. See Nor-
folk Redevelopment & Housing Auth. v. Chesapeake & Potomac Tel. Co., 464
U.S. 30 (1983).
189 See, e.g., Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus. Inc., 923 F. Supp. 1453, 1456 (D.
Wyo. 1996) (applying the knowledge requirement to all three prongs of the
fraud exception) [hereinafter "Rickert I"].
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Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division,'9" the federal district court
was "unwilling to infer a duty under [the fraud exception] re-
quiring defendants to volunteer information which is (1) not
required by statute or regulation, (2) not in response to a direct
inquiry by the FAA, or (3) not necessary in order to correct in-
formation previously supplied directly by the defendant to the
FAA." 191 In this case, the pilot of a small plane sued for injuries
sustained in a crash allegedly caused by the installation of a
faulty composite carburetor float manufactured by Rogers Cor-
poration. The plaintiff alleged that another defendant had made
misrepresentations to the FAA about design and manufacturing
defects in the float. The plaintiff did not explicitly assert that
Rogers Corporation knew about the alleged misrepresentations,
but did suggest that Rogers was aware of the alleged defects.
The court granted Roger Corporation's motion for summary
judgment, refusing to apply the fraud exception "merely be-
cause a defendant has not informed the FAA about either possi-
ble safety concerns regarding a part or possible
misrepresentations by other parties."'1 92
Similarly, in Butler, a state court properly refused to apply the
fraud exception where a manufacturer had not reported acci-
dents regarding the corresponding military version of the air-
craft at issue.' 93" The court explained that there was no evidence
that the manufacturer was required to do so.' 94 The plaintiffs
principally argued that by failing to report such accidents, the
manufacturer violated an FAA regulation requiring manufactur-
ers who hold type certificates to report "any failure" in an air-
craft.'95 The court disagreed. It found that manufacturers of
military aircraft are not required to obtain type certificates and
that therefore the regulation did not establish mandatory re-
porting requirements for military aircraft.196 The court found
190 Cartman v. Textron Lycoming Reciprocating Engine Division, No. 94-CV-
72582-DT, 1996 WL 316575 (E.D. Mich. Feb. 27 1996).
-1 Id. at *3.
192 Id.
193 Butler, No. BC 206780, at 7-8.
194 Id.
95 In 1989 and 1996, the years relevant to the case, FAR § 21.3 stated that "(a)
the holder of a Type Certificate .. , including a Parts Manufacturer Approval
(PMA) .... shall report any failure, malfunction, or defect in any product, part,
process, or article manufactured by it that it determines has resulted in any of the
occurrences listed in paragraph (c) if this section."
196 Butler, No. BC 206780, at 7-8. An affidavit submitted by Bell stated that
military aircraft are typically "purpose-built" to military procurement specifica-
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that plaintiffs had introduced no evidence showing that manu-
facturers of military aircraft actually reported such failures to
the FAA under that regulation.'97 The court said:
Plaintiffs' argument that the literal or plain meaning of 2.13 cov-
ers "any failure" is not persuasive against the apparent actual
practice of the FAA and the manufacturers. An agency's rules
and regulations must be read in the context of the agency's juris-
diction. The "plain meaning" guideline should not be followed
so as to interpret a rule as having expanded the scope of the
issuing agency's jurisdiction."8
In Campbell v. Parker-Hannifan Corp., 9 the court correctly
ruled that the fraud exception did not apply where the manufac-
turer did not report problems with the component part that
caused the accident where the problems had arisen in regard to
a different model plane. Campbell arose out of a crash that oc-
curred after the failure of vacuum pumps in the aircraft's flight
instruments. Plaintiffs challenged the court's grant of summary
judgment under GARA to Cessna, the plane's manufacturer.
The plaintiffs claimed that Cessna had concealed knowledge
about safety issues with the vacuum pumps, citing a National
Transportation Safety Board ("NTSB") report based on informa-
tion from the FAA that discussed vacuum pump accidents in a
different model of Cessna plane, the 210N, and recommended
that the FAA conduct further studies and issue directives about
the vacuum pumps in the Cessna 210N model aircraft. The
court noted that while the report noted concern by the FAA and
NTSB about the failure rate of the vacuum pumps, this concern
related to the failure rate in the 210N model plane, not the 310
model involved in the crash.2 '' The court observed that the de-
tailed review by the NTSB and the recommendations made to
the FAA for further study "tend to defeat, not support, claims of
misrepresentation and concealment by Cessna" and that plain-
tions and that while military and civilian aircraft may share common parts, these
aircraft are designed to different load spectrums, which can result in different
operating limitations and component service lives. See id. at 6-7.
197 Id. at 8.
198 Id.
199 Campbell v. Parker-Hannifan Corp., 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d 202 (Cal. Ct. App.
1999).
200 Id. at 208. The Butler court similarly ruled that a manufacturer's failure to
report problems with a part in the corresponding military version of a helicopter
was irrelevant. Butler, No. BC 206780, at 8 ("Nondisclosure of the military failures
was irrelevant.").
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tiffs failed to raise "any reasonable inference of knowing misrep-
resentation or concealment on the part of Cessna. 211
d. Pleading the Fraud Exception
Congress required plaintiffs seeking to invoke the fraud ex-
emption to plead with "specificity" the facts supporting the
fraud claim. Only a handful of courts have elaborated on the
contours of this pleading standard, but it is an "obvious analog"
to Federal Rule of Civil Procedure 9(b), which requires parties
to plead fraud with particularity. ''21 2 "This requirement is im-
portant because it immediately puts the burden on the claimant
to affirmatively set forth the facts supporting each allegation.2 °3
This heightened pleading standard is intended to prevent
plaintiffs from pleading general claims about very old aircraft
that either are not supported by facts or are frivolous.2 °4 With-
out this key requirement, plaintiffs counsel could make general
allegations of fraud and maintain a lawsuit long enough to em-
broil the defendant in expensive and burdensome discovery
with the goal of forcing a settlement.2 115 As two commentators
explained, " [W] ithout this initial gatekeeping device, GARA is at
risk of being ineffective, since it is specifically designed to guard
against this very kind of litigation tactic. ' 2 °6
Other commentators, though, have argued that this strict
pleading requirement raises a procedural problem: claimants
may not have access to information that the manufacturer has
and thus cannot satisfy the requirement. 20 7 As a result, claim-
ants may need to perform limited discovery in order to deter-
mine whether such facts exist.211 Courts generally have been
willing to allow plaintiffs to conduct limited discovery or file an
amended complaint to address problems with defective plead-
201 Campbell, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d. at 210.
202 Rickert I, 923 F. Supp. at 1456 .
203 Hedrick, supra note 110, at 405-06.
204 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 406.
205 Humphrey, supra note 4, at 175-76.
206 Oliver & Jones, supra note 50, at 253.
207 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 406.
208 Charles Hvass, former chairman of ATLA's aviation section, said defendants
would still face aggressive discovery: "We are going to be in the files of the FAA
and filing pretrial discovery requests - or actually presuit discovery requests
under . . . Federal Rule 29, which allows you to go forward and get discovery
before trial." Charles T. Hvass, Esq., Remarks, General Aviation Revitalization Act
Panel Discussion, 63J. AIR L. & COM. 169, 181 (1997).
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ings .20 At least one defendant has argued that these procedural
"helps" for plaintiff's counsel are unnecessary because ethical
provisions require attorneys to be knowledgeable about eviden-
tiary support for allegations or factual contentions in their
papers.21 °
In Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Industries Ltd., the plaintiff ar-
gued that the manufacturer fraudulently concealed information
about problems with the plane that led to the crash.211 The fed-
eral district court held that "GARA requires more than innu-
endo and inference; it demands 'specificity.' ' 2 12 The court
identified the elements requiring specificity in pleading as: "(1)
knowledge; (2) misrepresentation, concealment, or withholding
of required information to the FAA; (3) materiality and rele-
vance; and (4) a causal relationship between the harm and the
accident.21 3 The Rickert court granted the defendant's motion
to dismiss on the ground that the plaintiffs' evidence was merely
"differences of opinion concerning design issues" that were
"dress[ed] up" as "misrepresentations and concealments. 2 14
In Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., the state trial court rejected the
defendant's motion to dismiss, finding that the plaintiff ade-
200 See Order at 2, Hinkle v. Riley Aviation, Case No. 96-03161 NP (Mich. Cir.
Ct. Branch Cty. Mar. 21, 1999) (provisionally dismissing defendants on GARA
grounds but giving plaintiff leave to conduct discovery on whether specified ex-
ceptions to GARA might apply); Rickert I, 923 F. Supp. at 1453 (allowing plaintiff
30 additional days of discovery to explore facts supporting fraud exception where
defendant allegedly "stonewalled" discovery efforts).
210 Memorandum of Points and Authorities at 17, Carr v. United Technologies
Corp. (Cal. Super., Ct. Ventura Cty. Aug. 30, 1996) (No. CIV 152495) ("Code of
Civil Procedure § 128.7 requires an attorney, when signing a pleading to be filed
with the court (such as a complaint), to certify that he has conducted a reasona-
ble inquiry into the allegations and factual contentions in the pleading and certi-
fies that they have evidentiary support.")
21, Rickert I, 923 F. Supp. at 1453.
212 Id. at 1462.
213 Id. at 1456.
214 Id. at 1460 and 1462. The court, however, allowed an additional 30 days of
discovery on the fraud issue. See Rickert v. Mitsubishi Heavy Indus., Ltd., 929 F.
Supp. 380, 385 app. (D. Wyo. 1996) (entry of order staying summaryjudgment in
order to provide for limited discovery and supplemental briefing on summary
judgment motion). The plaintiff subsequently filed a motion to reconsider and
submitted additional evidence in support of her fraud claim. The evidence con-
sisted of two affidavits, both of which stated that the defendant knew of relevant
safety problems and knowingly withheld the information from the FAA. The
court found this testimony sufficient to "create a genuine issue of material fact
concerning a knowing misrepresentation" to defeat a summaryjudgment motion
based on GARA. Id. at 382.
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quately pled her state law cause of action despite GARA's height-
ened pleading standard.215 The court explained:
Defendant argues that Plaintiffs complaint failed to plead knowl-
edge and misrepresentation with the requisite specificity, but
merely pleads conclusions. A review of the complaint reveals
that Plaintiff has pled both knowledge and misrepresentation
with the requisite specificity, see paragraphs 17(b), (e), (f) and
(g). Plaintiff alleges, for example, in [17] (f) and (g) that Cessna
submitted to the FAA a series of reports which it knew at the time
the reports were submitted did not accurately and adequately re-
flect the flight handling qualities and characteristics, mainte-
nance requirements and vacuum air delivery system . . . Cessna
knew that it had made material misrepresentations to the
FAA... Plaintiff has adequately alleged the elements required by
Rickert.216
VII. GARA BARS CLAIMS FOR POST-SALE
FAILURE TO WARN
A. POST-SALE DUTY TO WARN
Plaintiffs have sought to avoid application of the statute of re-
pose by arguing that post-sale failure to warn claims should not
be barred by GARA. They argue that a manufacturer has a con-
tinuing post-sale duty to warn of alleged hazards involving the
plane, a duty that continues up until the time of an accident.
Courts have generally rejected this approach. 217 They have
noted that allowing such claims to proceed would eviscerate the
protections afforded by GARA, since practically every claim
could be recharacterized as a breach of the post-sale duty to
warn. Accordingly, courts have rejected plaintiffs' efforts to
evade GARA with post-sale failure to warn claims. The United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit took this approach
21.Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., No. 96-71886 (E.D. Mich. July 17, 1996) (on file
with author).
216 Id. at 15.
217 See, e.g., Campbell, 82 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 202. In this case, plaintiffs argued that
Cessna knew or should have known of safety problems with replacement vacuum
pumps manufactured by another company, which allegedly caused a plan to
crash. Plaintiffs claimed that "Cessna knew or should have known that the parts
would not work and failed to issue any warning to aircraft owners or to the FAA."
Id. at 209. The court rejected this argument, stating that "the GARA limitation
period may not be circumvented simply by labeling the claim as one for failure to
warn. Appellants are still attempting to hold Cessna liable for actions connected
with its role as manufacturer." Id. at 210.
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in Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A.,218 when it rejected the plaintiffs' post-
sale failure to warn claim. The Ninth Circuit stated that if the
alleged failure to warn re-started the 18-year repose period,
"GARA would have little value to manufacturers because the
plaintiff could always argue that an 18-year period commenced
if the manufacturer did nothing at all, while simultaneously ar-
guing that if the manufacturer did do something that, too,
would start a new 18-year period running. 219
A California state appeals court also ruled that the plaintiffs
could not proceed on a theory of breach of the independent
duty to warn. In Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp.,2 t ° the
court rejected the plaintiffs' argument that the defendant, a
general aviation aircraft parts manufacturer whose predecessor
had purchased the product line from the original manufacturer,
was liable for failure to warn. The plaintiffs had argued that the
successor had established an ongoing relationship with the pur-
chasers of the carburetor, from which it derived an economic
benefit. Plaintiffs said the successor knew about defects in the
carburetor and therefore had a duty to warn those customers of
the defects. The court refused to accept this argument, explain-
ing that California had not adopted this theory of liability, and
the court did not wish to do so in the circumstances of this case:
Precision's duties and obligations concerning this product, in-
cluding a continuing duty to warn, were imposed on it by federal
law. Imposing a separate and independent duty based on gen-
eral principles of tort law would not only be superfluous in light
of the federal statutory scheme regulating and overseeing the du-
ties of manufacturers in the general aviation industry, but would
also directly conflict with that statutory scheme.22'
A federal district court in the Ninth Circuit reached a differ-
ent conclusion. In Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc.,22 2 the
218 Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1078 .
219 Id. at 1088; see also Reynolds, Findings of Fact, at 8 (stating that "[t]o accept
plaintiffs' argument that a new cause of action arises every time there is an over-
haul at which the accused part arguably might have been replaced would render
a statute of repose largely meaningless" and where the accused part itself is pro-
tected by the statute of repose, the statute of repose cannot be circumvented by
recouching the claim as a 'failure to warn' claim or, as plaintiffs do here, a claim
that the allegedly defective part should have been replaced together with other
parts (which is simply a failure to warn claim under another guise.)).
220 Burroughs v. Precision Airmotive Corp., 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d 124 (Cal. Ct. App.
2000).
221 Burroughs, 93 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 136.
222 Kennedy v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., No. C98-5579RJB, at 8-9.
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United States District Court for the Western District of Washing-
ton ruled that Washington state law "clearly provides that a man-
ufacturer may be subject to liability for the failure to warn of
design defects in its products" and therefore that Bell had a
post-sale duty to warn of design defects.22 The court ruled that
it was for the jury to determine whether Bell breached that duty
as well as whether the helicopter had a design defect that proxi-
mately caused the accident and plaintiffs' damages.224 The Ken-
nedy court's ruling was unwise, as this approach undermines the
legislative purpose of GARA.
B. CLAIMS BASED ON AIRCRAFr MANUALS
Plaintiffs have focused on various flight and service manuals
in attempts to get around GARA. Most of the cases are a variant
on attempts to claim breach of a post-sale duty to warn. Courts
have recognized these as attempts to circumvent the statute of
repose by providing a "back door" to sue for the design flaw -
ostensibly not for the design flaw itself, but for the failure of the
manuals to adequately correct the flaw.
Under this approach, plaintiffs argue that revisions to flight
or maintenance manuals trigger the rolling limitations period
for claims involving new parts.225 This argument is patterned
after a pre-GARA state court case, Driver v. Burlington Aviation
Inc.,2 26 in which a court accepted the view that an instruction
manual rather than the aircraft was the defective product at is-
sue. 227 In Driver, the plaintiffs alleged that incorrect information
in the manual about carburetor icing and slow-flight characteris-
tics led to the crash of an airplane. Plaintiffs argued the North
Carolina statute of repose did not apply to their claims based on
the information manual, because the information manual was
sold separately. The North Carolina court said that if the infor-
mation manual were sold within the repose period, the claim
would not be precluded. That is because the manual, and not the
aircraft, was the defective product that created the plaintiffs'
cause of action.228
I " d. at 8 (citing RCW § 7.72.030(1) (c)).
224 id. at 9.
225 GARA, § 2(a)(2). See, e.g., Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 531; Buernan v. Raytheon
Aircraft Co., No. CV197-4742 CL (Mo. Cir. Ct., St. Charles Cty. Jan. 17, 2000)
(claims based on re-issuance of aircraft manual are barred by GARA).
226 Driver v. Burlington Aviation Inc., 430 S.E.2d 476 (N.C. App. 1993).
227 See Anton, supra note 11, at 803.
228 Driver, 430 S.E.2d at 483.
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Federal courts have rejected this approach.229 In one of the
first cases to interpret GARA, Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron,
Inc.,23° the defendants argued that the plaintiffs had fraudu-
lently joined one defendant, Bell Helicopter, in order to defeat
removal. The defendants said that as a matter of law, GARA pre-
vented any possibility of recovery by the plaintiffs against Bell,
and therefore that Bell's presence in the lawsuit did not defeat
removal. The plaintiff argued that GARA did not apply because
the aircraft accident was proximately caused by misleading in-
structions in a maintenance manual. It was alleged that the
manual failed to warn of the propensity of an aircraft part to fail
prematurely and to prescribe proper inspection procedures to
detect this design flaw. The plaintiff took the position that a
manual revision is a "new component, system, subassembly, or
other part which replaced another component, system, subas-
sembly, or other part originally in, or which was added to, the
aircraft" under Section 2(a) (2) of GARA. There was no evi-
dence as to when the allegedly misleading instructions first ap-
peared.23' Instead, the plaintiff argued that since the manual as
a whole was revised twice a year, the statute of repose was re-
started after each such revision.232 The plaintiff said, "By refus-
ing to apply the statute of repose under these circumstances,
courts will ensure that defendants don't take lightly their obliga-
tion to incorporate new information as the manuals are
republished. "233
The Alter court rejected this argument. The court relied on a
number of non-GARA statute of repose cases holding that man-
ufacturers' maintenance and repair manuals are not a "sepa-
rate" product or component upon which plaintiffs may base a
claim to avoid a repose statute. 2 4 Rather than constituting a
229 See, e.g., Butler, No. BC 206780, at 9 (after increasing part's retirement life
from 4,000 hours to 5,000 hours, "the resultant change in the maintenance man-
ual for the helicopter cannot be viewed as the installation of a new part in the
helicopter. The inspection tool and the maintenance manual are not parts of the
aircraft. The court cannot turn the meaning of words on their head in order to
preserve plaintiffs' claims against the Bell parties.").
230 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 531.
231 See id. at 537.
232 See id. at 538.
233 Id. at 537.
234 See, e.g., Alexander v. Beech Aircraft Corp., 952 F.2d 1215 (10th Cir. 1991).
In Alexander, a non-GARA case, a plane crashed after running out of fuel. The
plaintiffs argued that the operator handbook issued by the defendant manufac-
turer was defective because it overstated the amount of usable fuel in the aircraft.
The defendant manufacturer argued that the handbook was a "replacement
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"replacement part," the court said, the manual simply would be
"part of the evidence proffered by plaintiffs which bears on a
failure to warn theory" against the defendant. 2 5 The Alter court
said that these cases showed that a manufacturer's provision of
maintenance and repair manuals was part of its duty to warn as a
manufacturer, not a separate and discrete post-sale undertaking
creating a separate cause of action.236 Otherwise,
[t] he result would be the evisceration of the statute of repose.
If a plaintiff is precluded by the statute of repose from suing for
a design flaw in a product, the plaintiff must also be precluded
from suing for a failure to correct the design flaw, whether that
failure be in the inadequacy of the text of a subsequently issued
owner's manual or in repair guidelines subsequently sent to
mechanics. 237
The Alter court rejected the failure to warn claims based on
the allegedly misleading inspection manual. It ruled that GARA
barred the plaintiffs' manufacturing defect claims.23 8 In an-
other case arising out of the same incident, the court followed
the lead in Alter and granted the defense motion for summary
part" under the statute of repose which, like the similar GARA provisions, trig-
gered a new repose period. The Tenth Circuit held that an operator handbook
was not a "replacement part," but merely "part of the evidence proffered by plain-
tiffs which bears on a failure to warn theory" against the defendant. Id. at 1220.
Other state statute of repose cases cited in Alter include Schamel v. Textron-
Lycoming, 1F.3d 655, 657 (7th Cir. 1993) (Indiana statute of repose bars action
for failure to warn of alleged latent product defect; issuance of service manuals
and other sources of service information was not a separate and discrete post-sale
undertaking because such information is "generally necessary to satisfy the manu-
facturer's duty to warn"); Kochins v. Linden-Alimak, Inc., 799 F.2d 1128, 1135
(6th Cir. .1986) (Tennessee statute of repose bars claim for failure to warn; in-
struction manual cannot be considered a separate "product" issued within the
limitation period); Butchkosky v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 855 F. Supp. 1251, 1257
(S.D. Fla. 1993) (Florida statute of repose bars claims for helicopter repairs de-
spite plaintiffs argument that because repairs were done according to the manu-
facturers' instruction manual, and the manual was issued within the repose
period, the claim was still viable).
2 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 538 (citing Alexander, 952 F.2d at 1220).
2 13 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 540-41 & n.5.
237 Id. at 539 (quoting Butchkosky, 855 F. Supp. at 1255) (emphasis added by
Alter court).
238 Id. at 541. The court similarly rejected plaintiff's breach of warranty claim.
The court noted that under Texas law, a plaintiff can predicate a products liabil-
ity action on a breach of warranty under the Uniform Commercial Code. How-
ever, the court said, an operating manual does not constitute "goods" within the
meaning of the U.C.C. Therefore, GARA precludes a state law claim for breach
of warranty because Bell's maintenance manual is not a good, but rather part of
its duty to warn. Id. at 539 n.4.
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judgment on GARA grounds.239  Pro-plaintiff commentators
have criticized Alter as presenting a catch-22 situation from a pol-
icy standpoint:
On the one hand, as long as manufacturers are protected under
GARA with regard to updating their aircraft manuals, they have a
complete incentive to do so without the concern of additional
liability exposure. Yet, on the other hand, it is difficult to distin-
guish between the triggering of a new statute of repose for a new
part that is required by the manufacturer to be replaced for
safety reasons, and no new triggering date when the manufac-
turer changes or revises its maintenance manual to make the air-
craft safer for flight.24
In Alter, the court noted that the plaintiffs claimed both the
existence of a design defect and, essentially, failure to warn of
that defect. The court stated that plaintiffs' theory "is that a spe-
cific component failed because of defective design - a propen-
sity to prematurely fatigue and fail - and test, and that the
manual described an inspection procedure which did not cor-
rect the design flaw or allow it to be detected ... [T] he suit for
failure of the manuals to correct a design flaw is precluded by
the statute of repose that bars a suit for the design flaw. "241
In Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp.,242 plaintiffs filed suit
against a helicopter manufacturer after a crash. The pilot had
planned the trip not knowing that the last two gallons of gaso-
line in the helicopter's fuel tanks could not be used. The heli-
copter was within 10 minutes of its destination when the usable
fuel ran out and the plane crashed. Plaintiffs did not argue that
the fuel tanks were defective - they "conceded that the fuel
tanks themselves were in good working order. ' 243 Instead, plain-
tiffs alleged the helicopter's flight manual was defective because
it did not include an FAA-required warning that the last two gal-
lons of gasoline in the fuel tank would not burn. 24 4 They argued
2 39 See Shen Li v. Bell Helicopter Textron Inc., No. 4:96-CV-116-E (June 7,
1996) (granting defense motion for summary judgment on GARA ground);
Schneider, No. 542343, at 3 (granting defense motion for summary judgment on
ground that plaintiffs failure to warn claims based on alleged shortcomings in
service manuals, saying that allowing these claims "would circumvent GARA pro-
viding a back door to sue for a design flaw.").
240 See Hedrick, supra note 110, at 396.
241 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 540.
242 Caldwell v. Enstrom Helicopter Corp., 230 F.3d at 1115, 1157 (9th Cir.
2000).
243 See id. at 1156.
2,14 See id. at 1156-57.
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that while the helicopter was 23 years old, their claim fell within
GARA's "rolling" feature, because the flight manual had been
revised several times in the past 18 years and thus was a new
"system... or other part" of the helicopter within the meaning
of the rolling provision. The Ninth Circuit reversed the district
court's ruling that a revised manual, as a matter of law, can never
fall within GARA's rolling provision.
Instead, the Ninth Circuit ruled, an aircraft flight manual is a
"part of the aircraft"24 and, under certain circumstances, can
fall within GARA's rolling provision. Unlike other manufacturer
publications, flight manuals are required by the FAA to accom-
pany each aircraft and must contain "information that is neces-
sary for safe operation because of design, operating, or handling
characteristics." '46 Moreover, the Ninth Circuit explained, the
missing warning that was allegedly the cause of the accident at
issue was required by the FAA to be included in the flight manual. "The
manual specifically must include information about a gas tank's
unusable fuel supply, if the unusable portion exceeds one gallon
or five percent of the tank capacity. ' 247 The court concluded
that, in light of those federal requirements, "There is no room
to assert that a helicopter manufacturer's [flight] manual is a
separate product. 2 48
Even though a flight manual may be considered a part of the
aircraft, the Caldwell court ruled that a revision of the flight
manual does not circumvent the rolling GARA provision unless
the change itself caused the injury. The court explained this ruling:
Just as the installation of a new rotor blade does not start the 18-
year period of repose anew for purposes of an action for dam-
ages due to a faulty fuel system, a revision to any part of the man-
ual except that which describes the fuel system would be
irrelevant here. Furthermore, mere cosmetic changes (like
changing the manual's typeface) do not revive the statute of
repose.
!!,15 Id. at 1157.
2-11; See id. (citing 14 C.F.R. 27.1581 (a) (2)).
,17 Id. (citing 14 C.F.R. 27.1585(e)).
2-18 Id. The court further explained: "[A] flight manual is an integral part of the
general aviation aircraft product that a manufacturer sells. It is not a separate,
general instructional guide (like a book on how to ski), but instead is detailed
and particular to the aircraft to which it pertains. The manual is the "part" of the
aircraft that contains the instructions that are necessary to operate the aircraft
and is not separate from it." Id.
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In sum, if Defendant substantively altered, or deleted, a warning
about the fuel system from the manual within the last 18 years,
and it is alleged that the revision or omission is the proximate
cause of the accident, then GARA does not bar the action.249
Moreover, it is important to note that under Caldwell, the
manufacturer's failure to add the relevant warning to the man-
ual during the revision process was not enough to restart the
statute of repose. Indeed, that would be tantamount to allowing
GARA to be avoided by an alleged breach of a continuing duty
to warn. Instead, plaintiffs were required to prove both that the
manufacturer substantively altered or deleted an existing warn-
ing about the alleged problem during the repose period, and
that the revision or omission proximately caused the accident.
25
Subsequently, in Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A.,2 5 ' the Ninth Circuit
emphasized the limits of its holding in Caldwell. In Lyon, the
plaintiffs argued that the 18-year repose period was re-started
once the manufacturer discovered a problem with the aircraft,
which subsequently caused the accident.252 Plaintiffs said that
the manufacturer's failure to warn about the newly perceived
problem amounted "to something like replacement of a compo-
nent part" because it breached an alleged continuing duty to
upgrade and warn. 25 '3 The Ninth Circuit disagreed, saying:
"Were that so, GARA would have little value to manufacturers
because the plaintiff could always argue that an 18-year period
commenced if the manufacturer did nothing at all, while simul-
taneously arguing that if the manufacturer did do something
that, too, would start a new 18-year period running. That is not
the law."'254 The Ninth Circuit reemphasized the distinction it
drew between the revision or deletion of a relevant warning al-
ready in a flight manual, and post-sale failure to warn. 25 5 "What
we alluded to there, we reify here: a failure to warn is decidedly
not the same as replacing a component part with a new one,"
the Ninth Circuit said. "It does not allow the [plaintiffs] to by-
pass the GARA bar.
256
249 Id. at 1158 (emphasis added).
250 Id.
251 Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1078.
252 Id. at 1088.
253 Id.
254 Id. (citation omitted).
255 Id.
256 Id. (citation omnitted).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
Thus, Caldwell and Lyon establish a high standard for plaintiffs
to satisfy when seeking to avoid GARA with an argument based
on the revision of manuals during the repose period. First,
plaintiffs must establish that the manual at issue is required by
the FAA and thus is a "part" of the aircraft. Second, plaintiffs
must establish that the manufacturer "substantially altered or
deleted" an existing warning about the relevant problem with
the aircraft at some point during the repose period. Third,
plaintiffs must establish that the alteration or deletion of that
warning was the proximate cause of the accident. This high
standard is consistent with the language and legislative purpose
of GARA.
VIII. PROCEDURAL ISSUES
A. DOES GARA CREATE FEDERAL JURISDICTION?
To date, courts have uniformly held that GARA does not cre-
ate a basis for federal court jurisdiction. In Wright v. Bond-Air,
Ltd.,25 7 defendants sought to remove the case to federal court,
arguing that GARA provided a sufficient federal interest for it to
do so. Defendants conceded that the plaintiffs case arose
under state law. But they also argued that although the com-
plaint did not reference GARA, the plaintiff had "artfully
pleaded" facts supporting GARA's knowing misrepresentation
exception-thus creating a federal condition precedent to be
satisfied. 25" Defendants further contended that plaintiffs artful
pleading did not conceal the fact that their complaint presented
a federal question sufficient to confer federal jurisdiction. 59
The court disagreed, stating that under the well-pleaded com-
plaint rule, jurisdiction is determined from the face of the com-
plaint, not from a defense or allegations in the complaint that
anticipate a defense. 26 While the court acknowledged that two
exceptions to that rule exist, it said neither were met. First, it
said, defendants did not rely upon the "complete preemption"
exception, which provides for federal jurisdiction when the state
law upon which the complaint is based has been totally pre-
empted by federal law.1"' Next, it said, defendants failed to es-
tablish that the plaintiffs state law cause of action presented a
27 Wright v. Bond-Air, Ltd., 930 F. Supp. 300 (S.D. Mich. 1996).
25H Id. at 302.
259 Id. at 302-03.
2 (A Id. at 302.
20 i Id. at 302-03.
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substantial federal question that would support a finding that
the case arises under federal law.262
The court said that GARA did not create a federal cause of
action or preempt state substantive product liability law.263 In-
stead, the court said, "GARA creates a national statute of repose
and serves a gatekeeping function for Plaintiffs state law action.
GARA is narrowly drafted to preempt only state law statutes of
limitation or statutes of repose that would permit lawsuits be-
yond GARA's 18 year limitation period in circumstances where
its exceptions do not apply. ' 264 The mere fact that GARA re-
quires the consideration of FAA regulations did not raise a suffi-
ciently substantial federal issue, since FAA regulations do not
preempt traditional state law claims for negligence and do not
provide for a private right of action for violations of FAA regula-
tions.2 " Thus, the court said, consideration of the federal issue
"is not sufficiently substantial to confer federal question jurisdic-
tion under 28 U.S.C. § 1331. ''266
In Alter, the defendants argued that the federal court had sub-
ject matter jurisdiction over the case, which alleged state law
claims, because "GARA completely preempts state law." The
court decided the jurisdiction issue on another ground and de-
clined to consider this issue.267 The Alter defendants also argued
thatjoinder of the defendant with the GARA defense was fraud-
ulently done in order to defeat federal court jurisdiction. In
that case, the joinder of Bell Helicopter, a Texas-headquartered
defendant, ostensibly prevented removal under diversity juris-
diction from Texas state court under 28 U.S.C. § 1441(b). De-
fendants successfully argued, though, that GARA plainly barred
suit against Bell andjoinder of Bell was fraudulent. 268 The court
denied plaintiffs' motion to remand and instead dismissed the
claims against the defendant manufacturers on the basis of
GARA.269
262 Wright, 930 F. Supp. at 303.
263 Id. at 302.
264 Id.
265 Id. at 304.
266 Id. at 305.
267 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 541.
268 See id.
269 Id.
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B. BURDEN OF PROOF ISSUES
Once the defendant comes forward with evidence that the ac-
cused aircraft or part was more than 18 years old, the burden of
proof should shift to the plaintiff to come forward as to why the
case should not be dismissed under GARA. The plaintiff should
have to identify the part alleged to have caused the accident,
which is part of its burden of proving its case in chief under tort
law, and show evidence that it was installed as a new replace-
ment part on aircraft less than 18 years before.
In Reynolds v. Textron Inc., a case arising out of the alleged
failure of cylinder hold-nuts on an aircraft, the court empha-
sized that plaintiffs had the burden of proving that the rolling
repose period was applicable in their case. 270 The court said this
was true for two reasons:
First, defendant ... met its initial burden of proving the absence
of genuine factual issues and its entitlement tojudgment. There-
after, the burden shifted to plaintiffs as the non-moving party to
demonstrate a "genuine issue for trial." Second, GARA s
(2) (a) (2) places the burden on plaintiffs invoking the separate
limitation period for new replacement parts to adduce evidence
that a new replacement part had been installed less than 18 years
before the accident.271
The court then considered plaintiffs' evidence, including affi-
davits and engine log and repair records, and ruled that the
plaintiffs had submitted no credible evidence showing the instal-
lation of nuts made by the defendant on the engine. "The most
plaintiffs have shown is the possibility that cylinder hold-down
nuts might have been replaced with other nuts of unknown age
and origin, at some unknown time. Such evidence, even if as-
sumed true, both does not meet plaintiffs burden of proof and
is too speculative to defeat summary judgment on a statute of
repose. "272
270 Reynolds, Findings of Fact, at 10.
271 Id.
272 Id. at 14; see also Barkley v. Textron Lycoming, Inc., Case No. 34031 (Cal.
Super. Ct. Stanislaus Cty., Sept. 18, 1996) (plaintiffs claim that the repose period
was re-triggered by installation of defendant-manufactured component parts dur-
ing the 18-year repose period "is meaningless absent evidence that such parts
were manufactured fewer than 18 years before the accident [sic]"); accord Flores,
No. 96-1507-CIV (acknowledging plaintiff has burden of establishing the applica-
bility of the rolling statute of repose, but denying defense motion for summary
judgment where defendant failed to rebut plaintiffs allegation that a defective
airplane component was added during an overhaul within the repose period).
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Some courts, however, have put the burden on defendants.
In Victoria v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., both parties agreed that
the aircraft was manufactured more than 18 years prior to the
crash.27 3 The court said that in order to prevail on its motion
for summary judgment under GARA, the defendant was required
to prove that none of the component parts of the airplane con-
tributing to the cause of the crash was less than 18 years old.
The court said, "Placing the burden of proof on defendant to
establish its right to rely on GARA is consistent with federal law,
under which prescription is an affirmative defense. Moreover,
the burden is more equitably placed on defendant, since it more
readily has the records that would establish whether parts manu-
factured by it might have been placed on the subject aircraft. 274
The court's reasoning was erroneous.
First, the Victoria court made a material mistake of fact when it
said its ruling was justified because the manufacturer has the
maintenance records for a plane. Instead, the FAA requires the
owner or operator to keep those records. As a result, the plain-
tiff, not the defendant, is more likely to have ready access to that
information. Second, the court improperly flipped the burden
of proof of causation onto the defendant - who in Victoria was
required to prove that the crash was not caused by any compo-
nent part less than 18 years old - rather than the plaintiff. The
Victoria court miscited Altseimer as support for this ruling. The
Altseimer court granted summary judgment where the defendant
"provided undisputed evidence" that the aircraft and part in
question were more than 18 years old at the time of the crash. 275
The fact that the defendant provided "undisputed evidence" on
an issue does not mean the defendant is required to bear the
burden of proof on that issue. It simply means that the plaintiffs
failed to present competent evidence on that issue and raise a
material question of fact sufficient to defeat summary judgment.
Similarly, in Glover v. American Resource Corp.,2 7 6 the court de-
nied a summary judgment motion on GARA grounds brought
by General Electric, the manufacturer of the aircraft engine,
even though the two engines were more than 18 years old at the
time of the crash. The court ruled that "General Electric has
271 Victoria v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., No. 4:95-CV-723-A, at 2 (N.D. Tex.
Jan. 16, 1997).
274 Id. at 3 (citations omitted).
275 Altseimer, 919 F. Supp. at 342.
276 Glover v. American Resource Corp., No. 160673 (Cal. Super. Ct., Marin
Cty., Sept. 13, 1996).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
not shown that it did not replace or add a part which was defec-
tive ... General Electric has this initial burden in order to show
that the period of repose in GARA bars this action. ' 277 The
court said that even though the plaintiffs did not raise the re-
placement part issue in their complaints, General Electric had
the burden on this issue because "the present statute specifically
addresses the issue of defective replacement parts. Thus, Gen-
eral Electric needed to show that the defective replacement pro-
vision did not apply in order to meet its burden of showing the
action is barred by the Act. '2 78 The court rejected defendants'
argument that it had no initial burden on the issue of new or
added parts because plaintiffs did not allege in their complaints
that parts replaced or added within the past 18 years caused the
crash. The court said:
This is not a case where plaintiffs are raising any new issue or
theory of liability. They have all alleged that the engines were
defectively designed, manufactured, etc. It is not a new issue or
theory to say that a replaced or added part might be defective, as
opposed to an original part, particularly since General Electric
itself states in its reply brief that "component parts are constantly
being replaced. 2 79
The court said that General Electric admitted performing
what it termed ordinary and routine maintenance on the en-
gines during the repose period, and that "[t]he fact that Gen-
eral Electric did not recondition or overhaul the engines and
performed only routine maintenance does not raise the reason-
able inference that it did not replace any part which might have
caused the crash. '280 We believe that the courts ruling is not
supported by the spirit and black letter of GARA. Defendant
showed his aircraft in question was over eighteen years old.
Once that showing is made, the plaintiff should be required to
show why the statute of repose was inapplicable.
C. GARA APPLIES TO ACTIONS OCCURRING IN
FOREIGN COUNTRIES
Plaintiffs have tried to evade GARA by arguing that it applies
only to domestic accidents. The only federal court to address
277 Id. at 10.
278 Id. at 6.
279 Id. at 7 (citation and footnote omitted). The court also noted that three
complaints alleged that General Electric "'modified' the aircraft, and four others
alleged that General Electric was negligent in 'other activit[ies]."' Id. at 7.
280 Id. at 4.
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this specific issue disagreed, ruling in Alter v. Bell Helicopter Tex-
tron, Inc. 2 1 that GARA applies to civil actions regardless of
where the accident occurred. Other courts have implicitly ruled
that GARA applies to extraterritorial accidents, addressing the
application of GARA to claims arising out of such accidents with-
out discussing the issue. 28 2 In Alter, survivor-plaintiffs filed two
separate wrongful death products liability actions in Texas state
court arising out of a helicopter crash in Israel. The plaintiffs
argued that GARA was inapplicable because legislation of Con-
gress is meant to apply only within the territorial jurisdiction of
the United States, unless a contrary intent appears in the statute.
The plaintiffs relied on a United States Supreme Court case,
Smith v. United States, 283 which held that the Federal Tort Claims
Act does not waive the United States' sovereign immunity for
tort claims arising in Antarctica. The Alter court distinguished
Smith, noting that it involved a statute that created a cause of ac-
214tion. In contrast, the court said, GARA eliminates certain
claims against aircraft and component manufacturers.285 The
court explained that: "Plaintiffs interpretation of GARA would
have the anomalous effect of preventing litigants from bringing
an action in the United States while allowing litigants to bring
the same action in the United States if the accident occurred
abroad. 28
6
IX. GARA IS CLEARLY CONSTITUTIONAL
GARA's constitutionality as well as its application has been
challenged.287 Constitutional challenges may fall into two broad
281 Alter v. Bell Helicopter Textron, Inc., 944 F. Supp. 531 (S.D. Tex. 1996).
282 See, e.g., Flores, Case No, 96-1507-C1V (considering whether GARA's rolling
statute of repose bars plaintiffs' claims arising out of airplane crash in Bolivia);
Glover v. American Resource Corp., No. 160673 (Cal. Super. Ct. Marin Cty., Sept.
13, 1996) (discussing application of GARA to claims arising out of airplane crash
in Argentina); Campbell, 82 Cal. Rtpr. 2d at 202 (applying GARA to claims arising
out of airplane crash in Australia).
283 Smith v. United States, 507 U.S. 197 (1993).
284 Alter, 944 F. Supp. at 541.
285 Id.
286 Id.
287 See Victor E. Schwartz, Mark A. Behrens, Leavy Mathews III, Federalism and
Federal Liability Reform: The United States Constitution Supports Reform, 36 HARXv. J.
LEclS. 269 (1999); (discussing constitutional bases for federal civil justice reform
legislation); Anton, supra note 11, at 800-803; Perry H. Apelbaum & Samara T.
Ryder, The Third Wave of Federal Tort Reform: Protecting the Public or Pushing the Con-
stitutional Envelope, 8 CORNELLJ. L. & PUB. POL'y 591, 635-37 (1999) [hereinafter
"Apelbaum & Ryder"] (discussing constitutional bass for federal civil justice re-
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categories: first, whether GARA is a legitimate exercise of Con-
gressional authority, and, second, whether GARA is constitu-
tional with regard to accidents that occurred before its
enactment, both in suits filed before and in suits filed after its
enactment date.
Interestingly, the first issue, that of the constitutionality of
Congress's enactment of GARA, has been rarely litigated and
few opinions discuss the issue. The second issue - that of
GARA's retroactivity - has been more thoroughly litigated.
Given that seven years have passed since the statute was enacted
and the applicable statutes of limitations on pre-GARA accidents
most likely have run, case law on the issue is important only with
respect to federal liability reform.
A. GARA WAS ENACTED UNDER CONGRESS'
ARTICLE I AUTHORITY
It is clear that GARA is a legitimate exercise of Congressional
power. Congress enacted GARA under its Commerce Clause au-
thority, based on its concerns about the potential effects of
products liability suits on interstate economic activity. The
Supremacy Clause requires state courts to apply it. One com-
mentator, apparently conceding these points, has suggested that
GARA interferes with individual constitutional rights and may
be subject to challenge under due process and equal protection
provisions.2"' Still, this commentator conceded that under the
"rational relation" test, GARA is probably constitutionally
sound.28 9 Future efforts to challenge GARA's constitutionality
should prove unsuccessful. We will show why.
1. Commerce Clause
The Commerce Clause of the United States Constitution es-
tablishes the power of Congress "To regulate Commerce ...
among the several States .... -290 Under this Clause, Congress is
empowered to regulate three broad categories of activity: (1)
the use of the channels of interstate commerce; (2) the instru-
mentalities of interstate commerce, or persons or things in in-
form legislation); see also Boswell & Coats, supra note 18, at 556 ("Plaintiffs can be
expected to challenge the constitutionality of the statute of repose, as they have
challenged other examples of tort reform.").
288 See Anton, supra note 11, at 801-803.
289 Anton, supra note 11, at 803.
290 U.S. CONST., art. 1, § 8, cl. 3.
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terstate commerce, even if the threat to be addressed arises
from intrastate commerce, and (3) intrastate economic activities
that substantially affect interstate commerce.29' Congress must
have a rational basis to find that the regulated activity affects
interstate commerce, and select a means of regulation that is
reasonable and appropriate to achieve that end.292
The Supreme Court has ruled that while local activity may not
have a substantial effect on interstate commerce when consid-
ered in isolation, it may have a substantial effect on interstate
commerce when considered in the aggregate. In Wickard v. Fil-
burn,29 3 the Court upheld Congress's regulation of the consump-
tion of homegrown wheat because of its aggregate economic
effect on the interstate wheat market. The Court explained
that, "even if [the] activity [is] local and though it may not be
regarded as commerce, it may still... be reached by Congress if
it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate com-
merce. ''294 The Court also concluded that Congress may regu-
late activity "irrespective of whether [the] effect is what might at
some earlier time have been defined as 'direct' or 'indirect.' "295
Excessive litigation affects interstate commerce through high
damages awards, lack of uniformity and unpredictability under
state law, which add to the price of products, discourage innova-
tion, and hamper the competitiveness of American busi-
nesses. 29 Indeed, the Brookings Institution found that of all the
segments of the U.S. economy adversely affected by the tort liti-
gation explosion in the 1980s, the general aviation segment was
hit the hardest.297
291 See United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598, 608-09 (2000); United States v.
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 558-59 (1995).
292 See, e.g., Hodel v. Virginia Surface Mining & Reclamation Ass'n, Inc., 452
U.S. 264, 276 (1981); Atlanta Motel v. United States, 379 U.S. 241, 262 (1964).
293 Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942).
294 Id. at 125.
295 Id.; see also Hodel, 452 U.S. at 277 ("Even activity that is purely intrastate in
character may be regulated by Congress, where the activity, combined with like
conduct by others similarly situated, affects commerce among the States.").
296 See S. REP. No. 105-32, at 2-12 (1997) (accompanying Product Liability Re-
form Act of 1997). The Association of Trial Lawyers of America has dubbed
these "dubious contentions." SeeJeffery White, Does Products Bill Collide With Tenth
Amendment, TRIAL, Nov. 1997, at 32 (using GARA as example of questionable fed-
eral imposition of federal rules on state courts to be used in determining civil
disputes).
297 See Martin, supra note 8, at 478-99. For examples of excessive and often
frivolous litigation, see Boswell & Coats, supra note 18, at 542-47.
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Congress made clear that GARA was enacted to address the
foundering general aviation industry. Congress found that an
"important factor in the decline of general aviation manufactur-
ing has been the industry's product liability costs, which [had]
increased from $24 million in 1978 to more than $200 million a
year in recent years. "298 Significantly, Congress found that this
increase in liability costs had not occurred because aircraft had
become less safe; on the contrary, aviation accident rates had
been going down while liability costs were skyrocketing. 299
Congress found that because "[n]early all defects are discov-
ered during the early years of an aircraft's life," "[i] t is extremely
unlikely that there will be a valid basis for a suit against the man-
ufacturer of an aircraft that is more than 18 years old."3""' This is
particularly true in view of the fact that "[a] ircraft design and
manufacture are regulated by [the] FAA, which has the respon-
sibility for ordering corrective action if a defect is revealed after
an aircraft design is approved. '' 3 1  Nonetheless, many suits
against the manufacturers of older aircraft had been brought in
the expectation that "the manufacturers will settle to avoid the
expense of litigation. 30 2  Congress explained that
"[m]anufacturers incur substantial expense from these cases.
Beech Aircraft testified that the average cost of litigation was
$500,000 per case, even though Beech was generally successful
in defending the case. '"" Further support for GARA came from
the Presidential Commission on the aircraft industry which rec-
ommended a federal statute of repose as a shot in the arm for
the general aviation industry."" 4
Congress clearly had a rational basis for enacting GARA. Evi-
dence showed that overwhelming tort liability was decimating
the industry, with both interstate and international ramifica-
tions.'1 5 The enactment of the statute of repose was a legitimate
2)8 H.R. RUP. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 3.
299 Congress reported that in 1978, there were 12 general aviation accidents
per 100,000 hours, with 1,276 fatalities. In 1993, the rates had declined to 6.8
accidents per 100,000, with 715 fatalities. Id. at 3. In fact, the drafter of the
report wrote, "NTSB data shows that only 1% of general aviation accidents are





304 See President's Signing Statement, supra note 3, at 1678. See also discussion
at supra note 61.
3)5 H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 3-7; S. REP. No. 103-202 at 2-4 (1993).
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exercise of Congress's authority under the Commerce Clause to
regulate activities that substantially affect interstate
commerce.306
2. Supremacy Clause
With Congressional authority to enact GARA clearly estab-
lished under the Commerce Clause, the Supremacy Clause ap-
plies to bar challenges against GARA based on a conflict with a
state law that would allow a lawsuit to be filed more than 18
years after delivery of the aircraft. (As discussed, GARA explic-
itly provides for the application of state statutes of repose that
are shorter than the upper time limit established by GARA.)
The Supremacy Clause of the United States Constitution estab-
lishes that laws made by Congress in the exercise of its authority
are the "supreme Law of the Land."'" 7 If Congress decides that
an issue is important enough to the well-being of Americans to
deserve nationwide legislation and acts within its authority to de-
velop such legislation, "the Judges in every State shall be bound
thereby, any Thing in the Constitution or Laws of any State to
the Contrary notwithstanding.3118  To the extent the various
states have substantive liability laws addressing the same field as
laws enacted by Congress, the state laws are preempted and state
courts must enforce the federal laws."'
306 See, e.g., Lopez, 514 U.S. at 559-61; cf. Duke Power Co. v. Carolina Envtl.
Study Group, 438 U.S. 59 (1978) (it was reasonable under Due Process Clause to
enact liability limitation for purpose of revitalizing an industry).
307 U.S. CONST., art. VI, cl. 2.
308 Id.
309 See, e.g., Testa v. Katt, 330 U.S. 386 (1947). The United States Supreme
Court has regularly upheld substantive federal legislation that preempts state tort
liability laws. See, e.g., Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 86 (upholding as constitutional
Price-Anderson Act limiting liability for nuclear incidents, as it bears rational rela-
tionship to Congress's desire to stimulate private sector investment in nuclear
power); Usery v. Turner Elkhorn Mining Co., 428 U.S. 1 (1976) (upholding con-
stitutionality of Title IV of the Federal Coal Mine Health and Safety Act of 1969 as
amended by the Black Lung Benefits Act of 1972, which establishes federal com-
pensation scheme for coal miners alleging black lung disease); Mondou v. New
York, N.H. & Hartford R.R. Co., 223 U.S. 1, 51 (1912) (upholding constitutional-
ity of Federal Employers' Liability Act of 1908, which establishes federal workers'
compensation statute for railroad employees).
JOURNAL OF AIR LAW AND COMMERCE
B. CHALLENGES TO GARA's CONSTITUTIONALITY
1. Tenth Amendment Challenge
GARA has been subject to a states' rights challenge under the
Tenth Amendment to the United States - a "mirror image" of
the Supremacy Clause question. " " The Tenth Amendment pro-
vides that: "The powers not delegated to the United States by
the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved
to the States respectively, or to the people. 311
Historically, the Supreme Court has recognized Congress's
"extraordinary power" to enact legislation and has been reluc-
tant to invoke the Tenth Amendment to limit that authority.
The Court has explained that "[a] s long as it is acting within the
powers granted it under the Constitution, Congress may impose
its will on the States. Congress may legislate in areas tradition-
ally regulated by the States."'3 12 For example, the fact that Con-
gress has traditionally deferred in large measure to state
regulation of the insurance industry, for example, does not
mean that Congress must continue to do so; Congress does not
invade areas reserved to the states by the Tenth Amendment
"simply because it exercises its authority ... in a manner that
displaces the States' exercise of their police powers."3 3
The only significant federalism restraints on exercise of the
commerce power are that state regulatory processes may not be
"commandeered" for federal purposes, thereby insulating Con-
gress from political accountability, and that state executive offi-
cials cannot be required to administer or enforce federal
regulatory programs. In New York v. United States,'1 4 the Su-
preme Court of the United States struck down a provision of
federal legislation which directed the states to regulate the dis-
position of nuclear waste produced by the states. The Court
ruled that Congress may directly require or prohibit certain acts,
but that it lacked "the power directly to compel the States to
3'0 See New York v. United States, 505 U.S. 144, 156 (1992) (inquiries into ap-
plication of Congress' Article I powers and Tenth Amendment are "mirror
images" of each other).
311 U.S. CONST., amend. X.
312 See Gregory v. Ashcroft, 501 U.S. 452, 460 (1991) (discussing how the
Supremacy Clause is the textual authority granting the federal government power
over the states in the U.S. system of federalism); see also LAURENCE H. TRIBE,
AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL LAW §§ 5-20 (2d ed. 1988).
313 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 291 (upholding federal regulations of surface mining de-
spite traditional state role in regulating land use).
-14 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 166.
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require or prohibit those acts." The Court noted that the Com-
merce Clause "authorizes Congress to regulate interstate com-
merce directly; it does not authorize Congress to regulate state
governments' regulation of interstate commerce."' The Court
drew a sharp distinction between permissible federal legislation
that directs state courts to enforce federal laws and unconstitu-
tional legislation, such as the Waste Policy Act, that directs state
officials to create and enforce a congressionally mandated regu-
latory scheme. 16 The Court further stated:
Federal statutes enforceable in state courts do, in a sense, direct state
judges to enforce them, but this sort offederal "direction" of state judges is
mandated by the text of the Supremacy Clause. No comparable consti-
tutional provision authorizes Congress to command state legisla-
tures to legislate.3 1v
The Tenth Amendment also prevents Congress from requir-
ing state executives to administer or enforce federal regulatory
programs. In Printz v. United States,'18 the Court invalidated a
portion of the 1993 Brady Handgun Violence Prevention Act
amendments to the Gun Control Act of 1968 ("Brady Act")."'
The Brady Act required the Attorney General to establish a na-
tional system for instant background checks on prospective
handgun purchasers and commanded the "chief law enforce-
ment officer" of each local jurisdiction to conduct the back-
ground checks and perform related tasks until the national
system became operative. The Court said that while federal stat-
utes imposing obligations on state courts were legitimate, their
legitimacy did not imply that Congress could impose obligations
on state executives. 2" The Court wrote:
315 Id. The Court discussed two methods Congress could use to urge State
adoption of a legislative program consistent with federal interests:
First, under Congress' spending power, Congress may attach condi-
tions on the receipt of federal funds .... Second, where Congress
has the authority to regulate private activity under the Commerce
Clause, we have recognized Congress' power to offer States the
choice of regulating that activity according to federal standards or
having state law pre-empted by federal regulation.
Id. at 167. If states decline to participate in a federal scheme, Congress may not
force them to do so. Instead, to have its way, Congress must preempt state law
and regulate directly. Id. at 176.
316 Id. at 178-79.
317 Id. (emphasis added).
318 Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898 (1997).
319 18 U.S.C. §§ 921-925A (1994).
320 See Printz, 521 U.S. at 907-08.
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We held in New York that Congress cannot compel the States to
enact or enforce a federal regulatory program. Today we hold
that Congress cannot circumvent that prohibition by con-
scripting the State's officers directly. The Federal Government
may neither issue directives requiring the States to address partic-
ular problems, nor command the States' officers, or those of
their political subdivisions, to administer or enforce a federal
regulatory program. It matters not whether policy-making is in-
volved, and no case-by-case weighing of the burdens or benefits is
necessary; such commands are fundamentally incompatible with
our constitutional system of dual sovereignty.3 2'
These cases do not support the contention that GARA is un-
constitutional. The decisions make it clear that Congress can-
not compel state legislatures or executives to participate in a
federal regulatory or administrative scheme, but they suggest no
constitutional prohibition against legislation that asks state
courts to enforce a federal liability law. To the contrary, they
expressly distinguish state court enforcement of federal laws
from federal laws commanding state legislatures to legislate or
requiring state executive officials to administer a federal regula-
tory scheme. State courts have always been and continue to be
obligated to honor such legislation.
In contrast to the provisions examined by the Supreme Court
in Printz and New York, the GARA statute of repose is self-execut-
ing by its express terms. Nothing in GARA requires a state legis-
lature to enact any law or a state administrative official to
implement federal law. Thus, GARA does not compel the states
or state officers to enact and enforce a federal regulatory
scheme. Rather, GARA is a matter of substantive federal law ad-
dressing the scope of recovery of plaintiffs in certain actions. As
such, state courts are bound to apply this law.
A Michigan court recognized these legal principles in Hinkle
v. Riley Aviation. 23 In this case, the plaintiff challenged GARA
on a number of constitutional grounds, focusing primarily on
an alleged Tenth Amendment violation. She argued that Con-
gress "commandeered" the legislative processes of the states and
321 Id. at 935.
22 See Vicki C. Jackson, Federalism and the Uses and Limits of Law: Printz and
Pinciple? 111 HARV. L. REV. 2180, 2185-86 (1998) (indicating that the Printz and
New York decisions set forth a "clear-cut rule against federal 'commandeering' of
state legislative or executive officials," but do not alter the responsibility of state
courts to enforce federal laws).
323 Hinkle v. Riley Aviation, No. 96-03161 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct., Branch Cty. Sept.
30, 1999).
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offended principles of dual sovereignty by compelling state offi-
cials to implement or enforce GARA.324 Interestingly, she only
indirectly suggested that Congress lacked authority to enact
GARA on the basis that no interstate commerce is involved. 5
With no discussion, the court denied plaintiffs motion for sum-
mary judgment rejecting plaintiffs Tenth Amendment
challenge.326
2. Fifth Amendment Challenges
Given that GARA was enacted under Congress's Commerce
Clause power, plaintiffs may seek to attempt to establish an
abridgment of their individual rights under the Due Process or
Equal Protection Clause of the Fifth Amendment.3 2v Such at-
tempts should be unsuccessful.
a. Due Process Clause Challenge
The Fifth Amendment provides that "No person shall be ...
deprived of life, liberty or property without due process of
law. . . ." GARA does not violate due process guarantees, be-
cause plaintiffs do not have a property interest in a common law
cause of action against manufacturers of general aviation air-
craft and their parts. The United States Supreme Court has
stated that "[o]ur cases have clearly established that a person
has no property, no vested interest, in any rule of common
law.""" Thus, the "Constitution does not forbid the creation of
new rights, or the abolition of old ones recognized by the com-
324 Brief in Support of Plaintiff's Motion for Partial Summary Disposition at 8-
21, Hinkle v. Riley Aviation (Mich. Cir. Ct., Branch Cty. October 16, 1998) (No.
96-03161 NP) [hereinafter "Hinkle Plaintiff's Brief'].
325 See id. at 10 n.13 (arguing GARA is guised "as an economic revitalization of
a failing market"); see also id. (GARA "appeared to invoke Congress' power to
regulate interstate commerce as the basis therefor").
326 Order re: Plaintiffs Motion for Partial Summary Disposition Re: the Consti-
tutionality of the General Aviation Revitalization Act of 1994 at 1, Hinkle v. Riley
Aviation, No. 96-03161 NP (Mich. Cir. Ct. Branch Cty., Mar. 21, 1999).
3'27 Anton, supra note 11, at 801-803. In Schneider, the court, with little discus-
sion, rejected the plaintiffs argument that application of GARA to her claims
violated her due process rights. Schneider, No. 542343, at 3.
328 Id. (internal quotations and citations omitted); Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88
n.32. If a plaintiff has an identified property right in statutorily created rights,
procedural limits cannot be placed on them without appropriate procedures be-
fitting the nature of that right. Logan v. Zimmerman Brush Co., 455 U.S. 422,
428-33 (1982). That is not the case here.
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mon law, to attain a permissible legislative object"129 "despite the
fact that 'otherwise settled expectations' may be upset
thereby."33 The Supreme Court has noted that "statutes limit-
ing liability are relatively commonplace and have consistently
been enforced by the courts. "331 Moreover, state statutes of re-
pose have consistently been upheld under the Federal Constitu-
tion.332 Indeed, in Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A.,333 the United States
Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit rejected a plaintiff's
claim that her substantive due process rights were violated by
depriving her of her cause of action. The court explained that
"[w]e have squarely held that although a cause of action is a
29 Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 88 n.32 (quoting Silver v. Silver, 280 U.S. 117, 122
(1929)).
330 /d. (quoting Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 16).
331 Id. (citing Silver, 280 U.S. 117 (automobile guest statute); Providence &
New York S.S. Co. v. Hill Mfg. Co., 109 U.S. 578 (1883) (limitation of vessel
owner's liability); Thomason v. Sanchez, 539 F.2d 955 (3d Cir. 1976) (Federal
Drivers' Act); Indemnity Ins. Co. of N. An. v. Pan Am. Airways, 58 F. Supp. 338
(S.D.N.Y. 1944) (Warsaw Convention limitation on recovery for injuries suffered
during international air travel).
332 See Koch v. Shell Oil Co., 52 F.3d 878 (10th Cir. 1995) (upholding Kansas
statute of repose on product liability actions against, inter alia, federal and state
due process and equal protection challenges); Eaton v. Jarvis Prods. Corp., 965
F.2d 922 (10th Cir. 1992) (upholding Colorado repose statute concerning prod-
tict liability actions on state and federal due process and equal protection
grounds); Harris v. Black Clawson Co., 961 F.2d 547 (5th Cir. 1992) (upholding
Louisiana repose statute concerning defective design or construction actions on
unspecified constitutional grounds); Alexander, 952 F.2d at 1215 (upholding Indi-
ana repose statute concerning product liability actions on state and federal due
process and equal protection grounds); Lourdes High School, Inc. v. Sheffield
Brick & Tile Co., 870 F.2d 443 (8th Cir. 1989) (upholding Minnesota repose
statute barring actions for real property damage from challenge on federal due
process grounds); Oliveras-Salas v. Puerto Rico Highway Auth., 884 F.2d 1532 (1st
Cir. 1989) (upholding Puerto Rico repose statute concerning defective design or
construction actions on unspecified constitutional grounds); Eddings v. Volkswa-
genwerk, A.G., 835 F.2d 1369 (11 th Cir. 1988) (upholding Florida repose statute
concerning product liability actions on federal due process and equal protection
grounds); Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 F.2d 548 (3d Cir. 1985)
(upholding Pennsylvania repose statute barring wrongful death actions against
federal due process and equal protection challenge); Wayne v. TVA, 730 F.2d 392
(5th Cir. 1984) (upholding Tennessee repose statute concerning product liability
actions on federal due process and equal protection grounds); Mathis v. Eli Lilly
& Co., 719 F.2d 134, 141 (6th Cir. 1983) (upholding Tennessee products liability
statute of repose against claim it violated due process; "An injury in the nature of
a tort which occurs after a specified limitation period ... does not give rise to due
process protection.");Jewson v. Mayo Clinic, 691 F.2d 405 (8th Cir. 1982) (up-
holding Minnesota repose statute concerning malpractice actions on federal due
process and equal protection grounds).
333 Lyon v. Agusta S.P.A., 252 F.3d 1078 (9th Cir. 2001).
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'species of property, a party's property right in any cause of ac-
tion does not vest until a final unreviewable judgment is
obtained.' "
Even assuming that plaintiffs have a property interest in a
cause of action, the legislative balancing of interests reached by
Congress in GARA must be accorded the traditional presump-
tion of constitutionality that is generally given to economic regu-
lation. 35 Congress acted neither arbitrarily nor irrationally in
enacting GARA; therefore the federal statute of repose must be
upheld. -6 Under the Due Process Clause, economic regula-
tions like GARA's statute of repose represent a "legislative effort
to structure and accommodate the 'burdens and benefits of eco-
nomic life."' 337 Put another way, the test of due process is
whether Congress acted with a "legitimate legislative purpose
furthered by rational means, '" and "legislation is not unconsti-
tutional because it upsets even settled expectations."'33 GARA's
statute of repose "emerges as a classic example of economic leg-
islation" that must be upheld against a due process challenge
because its purpose is to "remove economic impediments in or-
der to stimulate the private development" of an industry. 
3 4 0
334 Id. at 1086 (quoting Grimesy v. Huff, 876 F.2d 738, 743-44 (9th Cir. 1989)).
335 "Assuming the courts continue to apply the lenient 'rational basis test,'
plaintiffs challenging federal tort reforms under the Fifth Amendment will be
placed in the difficult posture of overcoming the asserted legislative justifications.
This is a standard claimants have been unable to meet in Supreme Court cases
such as Usery and Duke Power." Apelbaum & Ryder, supra note 277, at 644.
'36 Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83; Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15.
337 Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83 (quoting Turner Elkhorn, 428 U.S. at 15). It is well
established that such legislative acts "come to the Court with a presumption of
constitutionality, and that the burden is on one complaining of a due process
violation to establish that the legislature has acted in an arbitrary and irrational
way." (internal quotations omitted).
338 Romein, 503 U.S. at 191 (internal quotations omitted).
339 Pension Benefit Guar. Corp., 467 U.S. at 719-30 (and authorities cited
therein).
340 Duke Power, 438 U.S. at 83. Although as a formal matter in New York Central
and Duke Power the Supreme Court reserved the question of whether such a quid
pro quo is necessary for compliance with due process and equal protection, there
is a significant degree of dicta skeptical of such a requirement. See Apelbaum &
Ryder, supra note 277, at 647-48 (citing cases). Apelbaum & Ryder write that in
Duke Power, for example, before finding that the Price-Anderson Act provided an
adequate quid pro quo, the Court noted, "It is not at all clear that the Due Pro-
cess Clause in fact requires that a legislatively enacted compensation scheme ei-
ther duplicate the recovery at common law or provide a reasonablyjust substitute
for the common-law or state tort law remedies it replaces." Id. (quoting Duke
Power at 88). Even if such a quid pro quo were required, these authors argue, a
likely argument could be made that GARA provides necessary benefits to society
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Congress chose the 18-year time limitation to "strike a fair bal-
ance" '341 by protecting manufacturers from the "long tail" of lia-
bility where their products have proved trustworthy in the long
term, while at the same time protecting injured parties' reasona-
ble rights to recovery.3 4 2 Congress observed that liability costs
had increased despite improvements in the industry's safety re-
cord,343 and reported National Transportation Safety Board sta-
tistics indicating that only one percent of general aviation
accidents are caused by design or manufacturing defects.344
Congress concluded that this legislation "can make a major con-
tribution to reversing the decline in general aviation aircraft
manufacturing. "Freed from excessive liability costs, manufac-
turers will be able to sell aircraft at lower prices. Relief from
most of the "tail" of liability for previously manufactured aircraft
will "enable the manufacturers to spend more on research and
development and enhance our manufacturers' ability to com-
pete with foreign companies." '45 In view of Congress's consid-
ered analysis of the decline in the general aviation industry and
its cause, the statute of repose is a reasonable exercise of Con-
gressional authority that is rationally related to its objective to
stimulate the general aviation industry.
b. Equal Protection Challenge
GARA also survives scrutiny under the equal protection com-
ponent of the Fifth Amendment. Economic legislation like
GARA does not employ suspect classifications or impinge on
fundamental rights; therefore it can withstand an equal protec-
generally, if not to the impaired claimants directly. Id. at 646. This contention
was accepted by the California Supreme Court in holding that state's medical
malpractice reforms against constitutional challenge. Fein v. Permanente Med.
Group, 695 P.2d 665 (Cal. 1985). The California court stated, "even if due pro-
cess principles required some 'quid pro quo' to support the statute, it would be
difficult to say that the preservation of a viable medical malpractice insurance
industry in this state was not an adequate benefit for the detriment the legislation
imposes on malpractice plaintiffs." Id. at 681 n.18. Justice White dissented from
plaintiffs appeal of Fein, finding there was a clear split concerning the constitu-
tionality of damage limitations in medical malpractice cases, noting, "[o]ne of
the reasons for the division among the state courts is [the quid pro quo] question
left unresolved by this Court in Duke Power .... See Fein, 474 U.S. at 894 (White
J., dissenting).
341 H.R. REP,. No. 103-525, pt. 1, at 3.
3,12 S. REP. No. 103-202, at 3; H.R. REP,. No. 103-525, pt. at 1, 3.
343 See id. at 2 (accidents per hours flown cut in half in fifteen-year period).
.144 See id. at 3.
'145 Id. at 4.
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tion challenge "if there is any reasonably conceived state of facts
that could provide a rational basis for the classification. 3" 6 Eco-
nomic legislation comes with a presumption of rationality,
347
and under the rational basis test, "those attacking the rationality
of the legislative classification have the burden to negate every
conceivable basis which might support it."' 348 If the classification
created by economic legislation results in some inequality, it will
nevertheless be upheld if it has a reasonable basis. 49 State law
statutes of repose regularly have been upheld against equal pro-
tection challenges under the United States Constitution.
3 50'
Congress had a rational basis to apply a statute of repose to
general aviation plaintiffs without similarly regulating commer-
cial airline plaintiffs. Similarly, it had a rational basis to bar
claims against manufacturers of older general aviation aircraft
without barring claims against manufacturers of older commer-
cial aviation aircraft or against maintenance operations.3 5 ' As
we have discussed, the record before Congress showed that gen-
eral aviation manufacturing had suffered a profound decline in
part due to the filing of unjustified tort suits. There is no record
showing a comparable decline in commercial aviation manufac-
turing as a result of product liability litigation. The fact that
Congress chooses to regulate in one area, but not others, does
346 Fed. Communications Comm'n v. Beach Communications, Inc., 508 U.S.
307, 313 (1993) .
347 Hodel, 452 U.S. at 331 ("Social and economic legislation ... that does not
employ suspect classifications or impinge on fundamental rights must be upheld
against equal protection attack when the legislative means are rationally related
to a legitimate government purpose."). Rational basis analysis, an approach and
principle designed to provide substantial deference to the legislative body, pro-
vides a standard which generally yields a conclusion validating the legislation
under consideration. See Stephen J. Werber, A National Product Liability Statute of
Repose - Let's Not, 64 TENN. L. REV. 763, 768 (1997) [hereinafter "Werber"].
'48 Beach Communications, 508 U.S. at 314.
349 Dandridge v. Williams, 397 U.S. 471, 485 (1970).
350 See, e.g., Schamel, 1 F.3d at 655; Eaton, 965 F.2d at 922; Harris, 961 F.2d at
547; Dinh v. Rust Int'l Corp., 974 F.2d 500 (4th Cir. 1992); Alexander, 952 F.2d at
1215; Cournoyer v. Massachusetts Bay Transp. Auth., 744 F.2d 208 (1st Cir.
1984) (upholding Massachusetts repose statute concerning defective design or
construction actions against federal equal protection challenge); Barwick v. Celo-
tex Corp., 736 F.2d 946 (4th Cir. 1984) (upholding North Carolina statute of
repose against equal protection challenge); Pitts v. Unarco Indus., Inc., 712 F.2d
276 (7th Cir. 1983).
351 See Werber, supra note 337, at 771 (making similar argument with regards
to national products liability repose statute).
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not render a statutory classification irrational. 5 2 Accordingly, it
was reasonable for Congress to limit GARA's application to that
portion of the aviation industry that had been stunted by prod-
uct liability litigation.
In Lyon, the plaintiffs argued that their equal protection
rights were violated because Congress chose to exempt lawsuits
pending on the date of GARA's enactment from the statute of
repose, while applying GARA to claims that arose before its en-
actment, but had not yet been filed. 5 The court rejected this
argument, stating that: "In truth, what seems to gall the Survi-
vors most is that other victims of the accident in question here
had already filed their actions." Relying on precedent, the
Ninth Circuit explained that Congress could legitimately limit
its concerns to people who "had legitimately and indisputably
relied on the state of the law prior" to the enactment of GARA.
The Court stated: "These individuals will suffer the most con-
crete injury because they have expended significant time and
effort to bring their action, not to mention substantial funds for
attorney's fees and court costs." '54
3. Guarantee Clause Challenge
In Hinkle v. Riley Aviation, the plaintiff challenged GARA as
violative of the Guarantee Clause of the United States Constitu-
tion. 55 The Guarantee Clause provides that "[t]he United
States shall guarantee to every State in the Union a Republican
Form of Government... ."... In most of the cases in which the
Supreme Court has been asked to apply the Clause, the Court
has found the claims presented to be nonjusticiable under the
"political question" doctrine.3 5 7 Based on the separation of pow-
35,2 See Dandridge, 397 U.S. at 486-87 (stating that "the Equal Protection Clause
does not require that a State must choose between attacking every aspect of a
problem or not attacking the problem at all); Eaton, 965 F.2d at 930 (upholding
state statute of repose against equal protection challenge on Dandridge rationale).
'153 Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1087.
'354 Id. at 1087-88 (quoting Gray v. First Winthrop Corp., 989 F.2d 1564, 1573-
74 (9th Cir. 1993) (finding it is not unusual for Congress to draw distinctions
between claims that are already part of a commenced civil action and those which
are possible but have not yet been filed)).
355 Hinkle Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 327, at 28-29.
356 U.S. CONST., art. 1V, § 4.
157 See, e.g., City of Rome v. United States, 446 U.S. 156, 182 n.17 (1980) (chal-
lenge to the preclearance requirements of the Voting Rights Act); Baker v. Carr,
369 U.S. 186, 218-229 (1962) (challenge to apportionment of state legislative dis-
tricts); Pacific States Tel. & Tel. Co. v. Oregon, 223 U.S. 118, 140-51(1912) (chal-
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ers doctrine, the political question doctrine provides that courts
cannot consider controversies that revolve around policy
choices and value determinations that are constitutionally com-
mitted to the legislative or executive branch. 358 But even when
the Supreme Court recently "indulg[ed] the assumption that
the Guarantee Clause provides a basis upon which a State or its
subdivisions may sue to enjoin the enforcement of a federal stat-
ute," the Court concluded plaintiff had not made out a claim. 59
The Court noted that:
[T]he protection afforded states by the guarantee clause does
not prevent Congress from pre-empting areas of substantive state
law. The guarantee clause grants states a measure of autonomy
over their governmental processes; it does not promise them sov-
ereignty over any aspect of private behavior. This ability of Con-
gress to override state substantive authority through the
supremacy clause-while preserving the autonomy of state gov-
ernmental processes under guarantee clause-assures a proper
balance between national power and state independence. 6 "
In Hinkle, the plaintiff argued that GARA "infringes upon
State sovereignty" because GARA "does not offer the state of
Michigan any choice." But that conclusion would apply to all
federal laws that preempt conflicting state laws, with equal force.
The preemption of state laws by validly enacted federal statutes,
of course, flows from the Supremacy Clause and in no way in-
fringes upon the guarantee of republican government. In en-
acting GARA, Congress did not interfere with power properly
lenge to initiative and referendum provisions of state constitution); Luther v.
Borden, 48 U.S. 1 (1849).
358 SeeJapan Whaling Ass'n v. Am. Cetacean Soc., 478 U.S. 221 (1986). Dismis-
sal of claims for nonjusticiability under the political question doctrine is proper
only if there is 1) a textually demonstrable constitutional commitment of the
issue to a coordinate political department; 2) a lack of judicially discoverable
issue and manageable standards for resolving it; 3) the impossibility of deciding
without an initial policy determination of a kind clearly for nonjudicial discre-
tion; 4) the impossibility of a court's undertaking independent resolution with-
out expressing lack of the respect due coordinate branches of government; 5) an
unusual need for unquestioning adherence to a political decision already made;
or 6) the potentiality of embarrassment from multifarious pronouncements by
various departments on one question. See, e.g., United States v. Munoz-Flores,
495 U.S. 385 (1990); INS v. Chadha, 462 U.S. 919 (1983), Baker, 369 U.S. at 186.
If a case does not present any of these characteristics, which are essential to a
finding that the case raises a political question, the case is justiciable. Munoz-
Flores, 495 U.S. at 385.
359 New York v. United States, 505 U.S. at 185-86 (emphasis added).
360 Id.
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exercised by the states, or with state legislative or administrative
machinery.
4. "Open Courts" and First Amendment Challenges
Some have argued that GARA denies plaintiffs a "fundamen-
tal right" to free access to the courts, as it "locks the courtroom
doors" before a tort litigant may open them.3 61 To the extent
any such "free access to the courts" claim is based on state con-
stitution "open courts" or "right to remedy" provisions,362
whatever these provisions may mean in state constitutions, they
cannot restrict the power of Congress;363 the United States Con-
stitution lacks an "open court" or "right to remedy" clause and
these ambiguous "rights" will not be read into that document.
The First Amendment's petition clause has been found to
protect a citizen's right of access to governmental mechanisms
for the redress of grievances, including the right of access to the
courts for that purpose. 64 These cases establish that potential
plaintiffs must be able to realize whatever right of access to the
courts they may have, i.e., through claims having a basis in the
law, or a "legally protected injury," '65 and that government can-
36, Hinkle Plaintiffs Brief, supra note 327, at 24-25.
362 At least 39 states have some form of open courts provision. See Stephen J.
Werber, Let's Not, supra note 337, at 791 n.57 (citing David Schuman, The Right to
a Remedy, 65 TEMP. L. Q. 1197, 1198 n.5, 1201-02 (1992)). Thirty-seven state con-
stitutions contain provisions that provide that all courts shall be open and that
every person shall have a remedy by due process of law. See Anton, supra note 11,
at 801 (citing Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 999 (Ala.
1982) (collecting examples). Several state supreme courts have found their re-
spective state statutes of repose unconstitutional under a rational relation test
because they violated the Constitution's open courts provisions or denied the
plaintiffs due process. See Brennaman v. R.M.I. Co., 639 N.E.2d 425 (Ohio 1994);
Hazine v. Montgomery Elevator Co., 861 P.2d 625 (Ariz. 1993); Berry v. Beech
Aircraft Corp., 717 P.2d 670 (Utah 1985); Kennedy v. Cumberland Eng'g Co.,
471 A.2d 195, 200-01 (R.I. 1984); Daugaard v. Baltic Coop. Bldg. Supply Ass'n,
349 N.W.2d 419, 427 (S.D. 1984); Heath v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 464 A.2d 288
(N.H. 1983); Lankford v. Sullivan, Long & Hagerty, 416 So. 2d 996, 1004 (Ala.
1982).
363 U.S. CONST. art. VI, cl. 2; Nash, 389 U.S. at 239-40.
364 See, e.g., California Motor Trans. Co. v. Trucking Unlimited, 404 U.S. 508,
510 (1972) (anti-trust laws may not be used to prohibit filing of lawsuit regardless
of plaintiff's anti-competitive intent in doing so); Bill Johnson's Restaurants, Inc.
v. NLRB, 461 U.S. 731, 741 (1983) (filing and prosecution of suit may not be
enjoined as unfair labor practice); Filippo v. Bongiovanni, 30 F.3d 424, 439 n.18,
442-43 (3d Cir. 1994), cert. denied, 115 S. Ct. 735 (1995).
5 Bill Johnson's, 461 U.S. at 743-44.
2002] THE GENERAL AVIATION REVITALIZATION ACT 1337
not burden the exercise of those existing rights.366 Nothing in
these cases, however, requires the government to create a cause
of action or prevent Congress from eliminating a tort cause of
action. A plaintiff "cannot claim that [s] he has been denied ac-
cess to court simply because the .. .legislature has restricted a
particular cause of action in a way that makes it unavailable to
[her]. Such an approach confuses 'access' with 'success,' and
[plaintiff] is not entitled to the latter. "367
Complaints about GARA's statute of repose are not based on
a denial of any procedural right to go to court, they are based
on a substantive denial of a claim. That is not the denial of a
plaintiffs right to seek judicial relief. "The concept of constitu-
tionally protected access to courts revolves around whether an
individual is able to make use of the court's processes to vindi-
cate such rights as he may have, as opposed to the extent to
which rights actually are extended to protect or compensate
him. 368
GARA validly preempts state law and limits tort claims to
those that can be filed prior to the expiration of an 18-year pe-
riod. Accordingly, plaintiffs have no legally cognizable interest
protected from encumbrance under the First Amendment.
C. CONSTITUTIONAL CHALLENGE TO GARA's APPLICATION TO
PRE-ENACTMENT ACCIDENTS
For a period after GARA was enacted some plaintiffs argued
that it was unconstitutional to apply GARA to accidents that oc-
curred before it was enacted. Such challenges are fading, be-
cause, for the most part, limitations statutes have run on claims
arising prior to the Act's 1994 effective date. These cases have
relevance, however, to show that the courts have supported the
legislative purpose underlying GARA. The cases also have rele-
s",6 See Sure-Tan. Inc. v. NLRB, 467 U.S. 883 897 (1984) (stating that Bill John-
son's was not applicable because the plaintiff had not suffered a "legally protected
injury" and the plaintiff had no 'Judicially cognizable interest" in procuring en-
forcement of immigration laws); Filippo, 30 F.3d at 442 (stating that the "petition
clause imposes on the United States an obligation to have at least some channel
open for those who seek redress for perceived grievances," but it is required to
recognize as a petition whatever communication is so characterized by protester);
Ciccarelli v. Carey Canadian Mines, Ltd., 757 F.2d 548, 554-555 (3d Cir. 1985)
(stasting that "there is no absolute unlimited constitutional right of access to
courts"; only reasonable right of access required).
367 Bowman v. Niagara Machine & Tool Works, Inc., 832 F.2d 1052, 1054 (7th
Cir. 1987).
368 Id.
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vance as a guide to Congress if and when it enacts tort reform
legislation in the future.
In Rixon v. Smith,"' for example, the plaintiffs filed suit after
the effective date of GARA, based on an aircraft accident that
occurred prior to the Act's effective date. They challenged the
constitutionality of the application of GARA to pre-enactment
accidents on the ground that it violated their individual due pro-
cess rights.3 70 The federal court disagreed, upheld the Act as
constitutional, and granted the defense motion for summary
judgment. The district court adopted the opinion of the magis-
trate judge, which stated that statutes with retroactive impact are
constitutional if they meet the due process "rational basis" test:
'Judgments about the wisdom of such legislation remain within
the exclusive province of the legislative and executive branches."
The magistrate found that GARA's purpose was to "strike a fair
balance by providing some certainty to manufacturers ... while
[at the same time] preserving [a] victims' right to bring suit for
compensation... 3 71 As a direct effect of GARA, "manufacturers
are protected from defending ageless claims which are costly to
investigate and litigate and Plaintiffs, on the other hand, are ex-
tended a large window of time during which an injured party
can properly investigate and commence claims which appear to
be meritorious. 3 72 The court found that GARA's retroactive ap-
plication was based on rational reasoning and upheld the statute
as constitutional.373
Similarly, in Reynolds v. Textron, Inc., plaintiffs argued that
their due process rights would be violated by the application of
GARA to claims arising out of a crash that occurred three days
after GARA was enacted.17 ' The court found that GARA is a leg-
islative act "adjusting the burdens and benefits of economic
life," and that therefore the statute would be presumed to be
constitutional unless Congress acted in an arbitrary and irra-
3" Rixon v. Smith, No. 96-714 (W.D. Pa. Jan. 6, 1997).
370 See id.
'7' See id. at 5 (citing H.R. REP. No. 103-525, pt. 2, at 6).
372 Id. at 6.
.3 Id. The magistrate court further stated that the retroactive application of
GARA did not deprive plaintiffs of any property rights in violation of the Fifth
Amendment, since property rights in civil actions do not vest until judgment is
entered. Id.; see also Schneider, No. 542343, at 3 (granting the defense motion for
summary judgment and rejecting a challenge to the retroactive application of
GARA based on due process grounds with little discussion).
974 Reynolds, Findings of Fact, at 4-5.
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tional manner. 75 The court examined Congress's purpose in
enacting GARA, found that the statute was reasonably related to
a legitimate congressional purpose and met the rational basis
test for constitutionality.17 The court said GARA expressly ap-
plied to accidents occurring prior to its date of enactment:
"Congress drew a bright line between actions filed on the date
of enactment, and actions not so filed. '31 77
Conversely, In Handley v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., a California state
trial court refused to apply GARA retroactively. 7 GARA was en-
acted about seven weeks after the aircraft accident at issue. The
court acknowledged that "the Act makes clear that it is indeed
retroactive," but nevertheless ruled that GARA could not be con-
stitutionally applied to the plaintiffs claim because to do so
would work a "manifest injustice."3 79 The Handley court relied
on a California state appeals court case, Aronson v. Superior
Court,380 to support its decision limiting the application of
GARA. The Aronson case dealt with a dispute involving a retro-
spective application of a shortened limitations period and stated
that a party nonetheless has a reasonable time to avail himself of
a remedy before the statute cuts off that right. "If the time left
to file suit is reasonable, no such constitutional violation occurs,
and the statute is applied as enacted, the Aronson court wrote, "If
no time is left, or only an unreasonably short time remains, then
the statute cannot be applied at all." '381 The Handley trial court
ruled that the seven-week period between the accident and the
enactment of GARA was "an unreasonably short time to be able
to analyze and thereafter perfect the remedy, all of which as-
sumes that the plaintiff sought counsel within days after the acci-
375 Id.
376 Id. at 5-7.
377 Id. at 7. See also Cartman, 1996 WL 316575 at *2 (stating that the amended
complaint against a manufacturer of defective component post does not "relate
back" Linder Fed. R. Civ. Pro. 15(c) so as to avoid GARA); Alter, 944 F. Supp. at
531; Altseimer, 919 F. Supp. at 340, 342-43 (stating that GARA bars claims that
arose before its enactment: "Although harsh, such a result is consistent with the
purpose of GARA to: 'establish a Federal statute of repose to protect general
aviation manufacturers from long-term liability in those instances where a partic-
ular aircraft has been in operation for a considerable number of years."'); Rickert
I, 923 F. Supp. at 1453.
378 Handley v. Wilbur-Ellis Co., No. 551197-7 (Cal. Super. Ct. Fresno Cty. June
10, 1996).
979 Id. at 5.
380 Aronson v. Superior Court, 191 Cal. App. 3d 294, 297 (Cal. App. 1987).
383 Id. at 287, quoted in Handley, at 4-5.
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dent ... ". ,18 2 Assuming that Aronson was correctly decided, the
California trial court misapplied it: seven weeks is not an "unrea-
sonably short time" to file a lawsuit.
The Handley trial court further erred by confusing the law gov-
erning limitations with that governing repose. As the United
States Court of Appeals for the Ninth Circuit explained in Lyon
when it rejected a similar procedural due process challenge to
using GARA to bar pre-enactment accidents:
The focus of a statute of repose is entirely different from the fo-
cus of a statute of limitations. The latter bars a plaintiff from
proceeding because he has slept on his rights, or otherwise been
inattentive. Therefore, it is manifestly unjust to tell somebody
that he has X years to file an action, and then shorten the time in
midstream. However, a statute of repose proceeds on the basis
that it is unfair to make somebody defend an action long after
something was done or some product was sold. It declares that
nobody should be liable at all after a certain amount of time has
passed, and that it is unjust to allow an action to proceed after
that ... While an injured party might feel aggrieved by the fact
that no action can be brought, repose is a choice that the legisla-
ture is free to make. 83
Like the Reynolds and Rixon courts, the Lyon court found
GARA to be constitutional when applied to pre-enactment acci-
dents. In Lyon, the Ninth Circuit considered a substantive due
process challenge and an equal protection challenge to the ret-
roactive application of GARA, as well as the procedural due pro-
cess challenge. The court rejected the substantive due process
challenge on the ground that plaintiffs had no vested property
right in their cause of action." 4 The court also rejected the
equal protection argument, which was based on the fact that
other claimants who had filed suit based on the same accident
before GARA was enacted could proceed with their claims while
the Lyon plaintiffs could not. The Court ruled that it was "not
irrational" for Congress to exempt plaintiffs who already had
filed suit from the GARA repose period, since "[t] hese individu-
als will suffer the most concrete injury because they have ex-
pended significant time and effort to bring their action, not to
mention substantial funds for attorney's fees and court costs." ' 5
382 Handley, at 5.
38 Lyon, 252 F.3d at 1087.
3'84 Id. at 1086.
385 Id. at 1087-88 (citation omitted).
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X. CONCLUSION
GARA is now over seven years old. It has revived an industry,
general aviation, which was near extinction. It has produced
over 25,000 well-paying jobs. Of equal importance is the fact
that the planes manufactured since GARA are the safest in his-
tory. Manufacturers of safety equipment who had shied away
from allowing their use on planes because of the specter of un-
limited liability now sell this equipment and improve it. Most
courts have respected the black letter and social policy that sup-
ports GARA. We put forth this article to help assure that they
will do so in the future.
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